• The fall of a "genius" is far more drastic than the creation of one:

    Anyone who's labeled a "genius" is in for a fall even if it's true; no one, nowhere can live up to the kind of worship and reverence that accompanies the appellation. It extends from their chosen endeavor to other aspects of their life and there's no escaping it; every word, pontification, movement is scrutinized just in case another profound utterance is on the way, something that can't be missed.

    What's worse is when the genius is false; in essence, through little fault of his own, he's simply doing what he's always done the way he knows how to do it and outside influences are bastardizing it into something that suits their ends whether it's a new totem, the advancement of an agenda or that they truly believe in the hype that the portrayal is accurate.

    The arrogance is absolute.

    The arrogance is a temptation to fate.

    And fate is not an entity that denies itself.

    Such is the case with the continued downfall of the latest "genius" to infect baseball, Mariners GM Jack Zduriencik. In a season that has collapsed into a nightmare worthy of the greatest horror writers of all time, it keeps getting worse. Presumably, the conclusion of the schedule can't come fast enough for Zduriencik and the entire Mariners organization....or can it?

    Given the way everything----everything!!----has gone wrong, one has to wonder if the end of the season will also be the end of Zduriencik's tenure as Mariners GM. His ascension came with such promise, such reverence and so much hope; the team improved to a ridiculous and unbelievable degree in his one year at the helm that he and the Mariners expected to vault into legitimate title contention two years after losing 100 games.

    It didn't work out that way.

    Preaching caution from the start, here's what I wrote in my book earlier this year:

Mariners GM Jack Zduriencik is the newest of the anointed “geniuses” for his aggressive trading; reliance on both stat zombie and scouting tenets; and utter fearlessness in making moves. Zduriencik has been a keen eye of talent for many years now in the 1990s with the Mets and especially with the Brewers in the early part of this decade. He’s undoubtedly energized the Mariners with his wheeling and dealing. But is his rebuilding of the club worthy of the callously thrown around term of “genius”?
    Bringing back Ken Griffey Jr. was a move of sentiment rather than on-field production, but it’s likely that the decision was forced on him by ownership. The trade for Cliff Lee fell into his lap; the signing of Chone Figgins is a questionable once considering the amount of money they’ll be paying a mid-30s speed player by the time it’s winding down; his signings of Eric Byrnes and Corey Patterson would’ve been ridiculed if it was anyone other than Zduriencik making the moves.
    Getting Milton Bradley for Carlos Silva was addition by subtraction and a worthwhile risk for a talented yet troubled player.
    While it’s trendy to look at the flashy moves Zduriencik made, in reality, there are many questions about this Mariners team and Zduriencik received undue credit for a team that had everything go wrong in 2008 and turned it around in 2009 based on little more than better health and better luck. He’s a smart GM and a good executive; but the “genius” label is highly premature.

    I got some stuff wrong in the book (the Reds; the Mets; Jake Peavy as my AL Cy Young Award winner, among many other things); but I drilled others. I thought the Mariners would contend; that they'd hover around the top of their division and be in the Wild Card mix to the end, but a lack of hitting would cause them to fall short----that too was wrong.

    Who could've expected the aforementioned lack of hitting to combine with Cliff Lee's injury; a shaky bullpen; a weak back-end of the rotation; along with off-field issues and lack of respect and discipline to craft a team that is going to lose close to 100 games again and be considered one of the biggest disappointments in the game for 2010?

    But my preaching of caution in the lust for Zduriencik?

    Bang.

    It's history. It's reality. Anyone with the slightest bit of baseball knowledge would tell you that the Mariners rise from 100-game loser in 2008 to 85-win surprise in 2009 was more of a function of largely the same group of players having their normal seasons. There are teams with a roster of players who are supposed to lose 100 games (the Pirates); then there are teams for whom accidental circumstance causes an epic crash; such was the case with the 2008 Mariners. They weren't the team that most expected to contend for a playoff spot after a surprising 88-win 2007 and the off-season acquisition of Erik Bedard; but they should not have lost 100-games based on talent level. 

    Sometimes these things happen.

    Now, after 2009 and a flurry of moves that neither improved nor deteriorated the club in any appreciable aspect other than slashing payroll, they've plummeted again. The names that came and went through the revolving door----Jack Wilson, Josh Wilson, Carlos Silva, Milton Bradley, Bedard, Brandon Morrow, Brandon League, Casey Kotchman, Bill Hall----are largely irrelevant. The bottom line is that it didn't work.

    Did Zduriencik get caught up in the sudden recognition accorded on a longtime quality baseball executive who'd paid his dues the old fashioned way and worked his way up to his current position? It's possible. Did he know that the team might not be as good as the "experts" in the media implied? Probably.

    Did he expect this?

    No. 

    The on-field terror would be palatable to ownership if that's all there was in terms of indicting Zduriencik for the way things have degenerated so far, so fast. But it's not. The Chone Figgins signing may have been a shruggable mistake (in his first year anyway) that hasn't worked; but the Figgins fight with manager Don Wakamatsu exemplified the lack of respect evident for a manager who was credited with doing a fine job in 2009; Griffey's alleged nap in the clubhouse when he was needed to pinch hit was another transgression for which the manager could be blamed, but why was Griffey even on the team to begin with?

    Bradley is Bradley; no one thought he would: A) behave; or B) perform. Getting rid of Silva's contract was far more important than anything Bradley did or didn't do provided the temperamental outfielder didn't kill someone.

    Then there are the larger failures that do fall at the feet of the GM.

    The firing of Wakamatsu may have been necessary; it may have been the right thing to do for the long-term health of the club----if he wasn't going to be managing the team when they turn the corner and had lost the respect of the players (if he ever had it to begin with), then he had to go. No one can say with any seriousness that Wakamatsu did a good job this season, but that doesn't eliminate the perception that he was scapegoated. No press conference in which the bosses of a club stand there and say "everyone's accountable" can disguise that fact----that Wakamatsu took the fall for the players he was provided.

    None of that is worthy of anything more than acceptance and a "that's the way it breaks" reaction.

    Then you get to the other "stuff".

    First, Zduriencik was accused of breach of baseball protocol by continuing to negotiate with other clubs in trading Lee after he supposedly had an agreement to send the Stone Cold Killer to the Yankees. Backing out on the deal because he received a better one from the Rangers, the Yankees were livid to the point of reportedly vowing to never do business with the Mariners again.

    While I felt it was technically a line-straddle to do what Zduriencik did, it was well within the boundaries of cold-hearted business to turn the tables on the Yankees and use an advantage that he had with a player the Yankees wanted. The Mariners don't have the financial might the Yankees do and very little can be done about that, but Zduriencik did a dance to get the players he wanted from the Rangers and spurned the Yankees. 

    But what did he get from the Rangers? And did he know about one specific player's off-field history?

    Zduriencik is being publicly savaged for the back-and-forth regarding prospect Josh Lueke.

    Lueke is a right handed pitcher with great strikeout numbers and a 95 mph fastball.

    But that's not all.

    The story, just exploding right now, is that Lueke was accused of rape and sodomy in an incident that occurred two-and-a-half years ago while in A ball with the Rangers. The entire story of the episode can be read here in the article by Geoff Baker.

    I'm not getting into the accusation or any personal attacks on Lueke. I don't know what happened and nor do you. Baker's solid reporting is there for you to come to a conclusion on your own.

    Suffice it to say it doesn't reflect well on Zduriencik that he appears to be lying or "misremembering" (to quote Roger Clemens) about what he knew or didn't. On one level, you can gaze at the comments of the fired Rick Adair with something of a jaundiced eye; obviously he wasn't happy about being dismissed; but his accounting dovetails with that of the Rangers GM Jon Daniels as to the severity of Lueke's off-field issues and how the Rangers offered to take Lueke back; and Adair worked for the Rangers as their minor league pitching coordinator prior to joining the Mariners.

    Someone is not being truthful. 

    This is not good.

    You can take any move made by Zduriencik and dole criticism or credit; you can even lambaste him for his apparent lack of integrity after the Lee trade/non-trade with the Yankees and for tossing Wakamatsu overboard at the first sign of trouble. But the conglomeration of events don't shine positively on Zduriencik and how he's run the Mariners.

    The 2010 season has been a disaster on the field. Zduriencik's veneer of "genius" is gone. His supporters are dwindling by the day, by the moment; as every new charge appears, his job status is more and more tenuous.

    A chasm between blind love and alienation seems vast, but is, in actuality only one or two steps away from one another. The errors in player personnel are understandable and acceptable; the questionable tactics in trading an in-demand player are elusive; but this? Acquiring a player with that on his rap sheet? Then denying he knew about it and causing more embarrassment to an already reeling organization?

    I would not have touched Josh Lueke.

    But Zduriencik did. He took a player he should not have taken and there's no excuse.

    Not only is Zduriencik cast out of his congregation of devotees for whom everything he said and did was the baseball gospel, but I have a feeling he's going to be out of a job very, very soon. 

    And you can't argue with the reasoning. 

    I think he's going to get fired.

    I'd fire him too. 

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I was a guest with Sal at SportsFan Buzz yesterday talking about the Nyjer Morgan, the Cardinals, the pennant races and a whole lot more. You can download it to I-Tunes via Sal's site; visit him on Facebook and get it directly here. 

    My voice...does things to people. 

    Like it or not, you know you're getting the truth as I see it. It's worth something.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• Cardinals in freefall:

    Don't you hate the unexplainable?

    It's easy to look at teams like the Mariners; the Pirates; the Diamondbacks; the Cubs; even teams that are hovering around .500 like the Marlins and Mets---and diagnose what's wrong; but when a team has the firepower, the pitching, the genius manager as the Cardinals do and they're in a rapid descent into near baseball purgatory of a non-contending September, you try to find an explanation----even if there isn't one.

    How was this possible? After their three-game sweep over the Reds in a contentious, fight-fueled, mouthy series in which they left Cincinnati tied for first place (and actually took the lead in the division the next day), the Cardinals have dropped a ridiculous 9 games in the standings in a little over two weeks. Granted, the Reds have gone 14-4 in that span, but the Cardinals have been awful. 

    Is it the bullpen? Is it that they're not hitting? Have they run into certain teams that have gotten solid performances for a game or two? Has Tony La Russa lost his magic? Or is it a combination of everything?

    There's no excuse for a team with three starting pitchers who have ERAs under 3----two legitimate Cy Young Award contenders in Chris Carpenter and Adam Wainwright; and Jaime Garcia, a Rookie of the Year candidate----to be losing so many games. They also have the best hitter in baseball (Albert Pujols); another top 10 (or 15) player in Matt Holliday; some other pieces that have produced in Colby Rasmus and the clutch Yadier Molina (who singlehandedly stops the opposition's running game); and Tony La Russa.

    What's the problem?

    A team that's fancies itself as a World Series contender (and they were my pick to win the NL pennant this year) cannot lose two of three to the Pirates; three of four to the Nationals; and get swept by the Astros. It can't happen. 

    There's no easy answer for what ails the Cardinals. For teams like the Mariners for example, you can simply say, "well, they can't hit" and understand why they're in their current predicament; or the Diamondbacks, whose bullpen is rancid, and have lost so many games because of that, you don't have to perform a "macro audit" to find out what the issues are----they're right there.

    But with the Cardinals? 

    The inmates aren't running the asylum; they're well-run; they spend money; they have a good group of players and people; so what's the issue?

    It may just be the obvious combination of running into some teams with nothing to lose (the Pirates and Nats); and others who are playing far better than they're given credit for (the Astros); and that the Cardinals' timing is a bit off. They're getting good pitching and not hitting; they're getting hitting and bad pitching; and games that they should win, they're losing because of a shaky performance from their bullpen.

    This is a team that has many questions ahead of them if the season continues to spiral. La Russa won his power struggle with the stat zombie faction in the front office last year when they traded for Holliday and Mark DeRosa; they spent the cash (some say way too much of it considering the market) to keep Holliday; and they traded for Jake Westbrook mid-season this year. It failed in 2009 because of a bad break in which Holliday lost a ball in the lights against the Dodgers in the NLDS and they got swept before they knew what hit them. Now they're running out of time to make a run back into realistic playoff contention.

    The next year is going to be critical for the Cardinals. La Russa is taking it year-to-year as manager; it's safe to assume that he'll be back for Pujols's last season under contract with the club in 2011; Carpenter is injury-prone and has been healthy for most of the past two seasons----at age 36, can they Cardinals reasonably expect that to continue? Kyle Lohse is making nearly $12 million for 2011 and 2012 and is a disaster----his contract is at least as terrible as that of Oliver Perez.

    There are many questions along with the big one----Pujols.

    Prior to the Ryan Howard contract, the Cardinals had a chance to get Pujols at a relatively reasonable rate for the Joe DiMaggio of his era. Now, it has to eat away at a player as prideful as Pujols that Howard----shielded in the Phillies lineup; playing in a bandbox; average defensively and nowhere near as great a player----is making so much money.

    Pujols is going to want to get paid.

    And the Cardinals may not have the money to satisfy him.

    Add in the fact that Pujols is listed as 30-years-old (something I don't buy); is going to want a guaranteed contract for ten years; and is playing for a team with a limit to the money they can spend, and you start to think that Pujols might really leave the Cardinals after 2011 or they could conceivably listen to offers in a trade. 

    Would they dare to entertain the notion of trading him? La Russa would be dead-set against it, but considering the way he's gotten everything he's wanted in the past two years and the team is plummeting into the sea like a badly constructed North Korean missile, how much longer are GM John Mozeliak and owner Bill DeWitt going to acquiesce to the manager's wishes when he's not getting the results on the field?

    This team is in trouble now and in the future.

    Big trouble.

• Ideas come when you brainstorm:

    Trying to come to a solution to fix the Mets, the easiest thing to do is to suggest a new GM, new manager, drastic trades or any permutation within those areas. When the (unlikely) idea was broached of hiring some young, smart assistant with a background in scouting and knowledge of the numbers, it was dismissed because the Mets aren't going to do that since they: A) won't hire outside the Mets family unless they do an about face of their history; and B) aren't going to give the keys to the franchise to some kid and let him do whatever he wants. 

    There's a basis in the reluctance to do that. For every Theo Epstein who's evolved into one of the best GMs in baseball; there's a Paul DePodesta who was a nightmare. But the mention of Epstein brought up another thought: Epstein wasn't automatically handed control of the Red Sox organization. Epstein had someone to keep an eye on him; someone who'd helped build two ballparks for two prior franchises he'd worked for; had some semblance of a personality; and oversaw what it was the 28-year-old GM did before letting him go off on his own.

    Why don't the Mets look into Larry Lucchino taking over as club president? 

    Obviously, the hurdles are massive. Lucchino is part of John Henry's ownership group in Boston; the Mets aren't going to give him a stake in the team; but these obstacles are not insurmountable.  Ownership points are bought and sold regularly. Henry owned the Marlins before switching to the Red Sox; Jeffrey Loria moved from the Expos to the Marlins; team executives can have their shares bought out if they choose to move on. 

    The Mets are going to be desperate once this season is mercifully over. 

    Why not? 

    Why not explore the concept of an administrator coming in and putting things in order? Lucchino has dealt with meddling owners before with the Orioles and Peter Angelos and, despite the criticism he receives, Jeff Wilpon is nowhere near as reviled as Angelos. People forget now that Epstein and Lucchino's falling out (in a different power struggle compared to the factional, theoretical, strategic one with the Cardinals) stemmed from Epstein's somewhat immature, "I don't hafta listen to you anymore!!" tantrum a year after the Red Sox had won the World Series. Epstein stormed out on the Red Sox and later returned. Now, it's Lucchino who's been marginalized because of Epstein's success.

    It's a natural progression. 

    Would Lucchino be interested in such a thought? Taking over the Mets? Being in the same city with the Yankees, whom he dubbed "The Evil Empire"? His ego would love the thought of getting the credit for turning around a team that truly isn't more than a tweak here and there away from returning to legitimate contending status. 

    Again, why not? 

• Viewer Mail 9.2.2010:

Fragile Freddy writes RE Aroldis Chapman, Stephen Strasburg and other phenoms:

While Chapman looks very good don't forget that Daisuke, Irabu, and others have exploded on their debut only to fade quickly.

I'm surprised to see a guy who reasonably recommended caution re: Strasburg gush so enthusiastically after one appearance by Aroldis.

Jane Heller at Confessions of a She-Fan also writes RE Aroldis Chapman:

Maybe the Yankees and other big market teams didn't open their wallets for Chapman precisely because of Irabu, Contreras, Dice K, etc. He was a gamble, but good for the Reds for taking the risk.

    These are fair points.

    That said, you can't compare the flair Chapman showed with Hideki Irabu, who looked more like a sad sack;  Daisuke Matsuzaka, with whom I was never impressed; and Strasburg, with whom I preached caution more because of the way he was anointed immediately and the amount of money spent on him as an amateur and how he was viewed as an organizational savior. Chapman is Cuban and the Cubans have more of a freewheeling way of letting their pitchers develop mechanically and physically. Pitch counts? We don't need no stinkin' pitch counts! 

    My question is more in line with how could these teams look at a player like Irabu, Kei Igawa and Matsuzaka and decide the amount of money was more worthwhile to spend on them when Chapman's stuff is better and he comes from a land where he's more likely to be durable. It's not about a baseline decision to sign a player or not sign a player; it's about individual judgment independent of what's happened before.

Jeff (Street Boss) at Red State Blue State writes RE Jeff Francoeur:

Whether he be a Met, Ranger or Brave, Frenchie will always be one of those loud-mouthed, illogical, uninformed right-wing Christians.

For that, he gets no sympathy from me.

    I never heard Frenchy talk about Jesus. Yeah, it's annoying when you hear athletes go on about their faith; many times it's for affect rather than any real belief; but I couldn't care less about that if he hit 25 homers and showed a bit more patience at the plate; then again, most fans would cheer for Ted Bundy if he got a big hit in the ninth inning.

    As long as they don't come up with the nonsense, "He meant it that way" when they make an error, I'm not bothered.

Maury writes RE Dixie Walker:

Dixie Walker was not a star pitcher or even a mediocre one. He was an outfielder and "The People's Cherce" for Brooklyn Dodgers fans. 

    Maury's referring to my posting Do The Right Thing from last week.

    The writer of the Wall Street Journal editorial about Jackie Robinson and Branch Rickey said that Walker was a pitcher and I didn't correct the error; technically it wasn't my mistake, but that's no defense for me not pointing it out in my posting on the subject. 

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I'll be on with Sal at SportsFan Buzz later today. It should be up in the afternoon. Maybe I'll let him bypass the Mets today without wondering why. 

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• They swung at what they heard:

    Aroldis Chapman of the Cincinnati Reds exploded onto the big league scene last night with a fastball clocked at 103 mph.

    It's not the sheer velocity of the fastball itself----we've seen power fastballers before; any big league hitter can stand in and adjust his strategy to catch up to a fastball----but it was the look of bewilderment, "let me just make contact", along with a pleading for divine intervention to the tune of "please don't let that thing hit me" that was most striking among the Brewers hitters.

    Any lefty called on to face Chapman with his slinging, herky-jerky motion has as much of a chance to get a hit as lefties did against Randy Johnson when Johnson was in his prime. And Chapman throws harder. 

    You can get an analysis of Chapman anywhere from voices both credible and not; when I first saw the clips of him in the spring, he looked like failed Yankees prospect Brien Taylor; now, having seen him pitch, he's unlike anyone I've seen. His mechanics bring to the forefront the cultural aspects that are inherent with pitchers who come to North America and are established enough not to be mucked with by organizational pitching coaches. You see it with the Japanese pitchers who----almost to a man----have a uniqueness about their deliveries that includes a pause, ostensibly to "load up" and increase bodily force toward the plate. The Cubans have a quirkiness exemplified by Orlando Hernandez in which he brought his hands over his head, raised them up and down at his leg kick and brought an array of pitches and arm angles. 

    Chapman's motion was deceptively simple while still being personal. He didn't make any histrionic hand movements, instead he had his hands relatively stationary in front of his face; stepping back and turning, he folded himself up with his back to the hitter and unloaded in a free and easy delivery throwing slightly across his body and unleashing that blast of power. Combined with the deception of not seeing the ball coming out of his hand, the 3/4 angle, the speed (he's the combination of being sneaky fast and fast); and the slider, I don't see how anyone's going to hit him unless he makes a mistake. 

    None of that is the point.

    The point is how the Reds got Chapman in the first place.

    Did the Yankees, Red Sox, Mets, Orioles, White Sox or any other larger market team you could name not see this? Did they not realize how much of a weapon he could be? 

    Not to pick on any team or GM in particular, but the Red Sox spent all that money on Daisuke Matsuzaka and lamented the loss of Jose Contreras, but didn't recognize Chapman?

    The Yankees threw money into the toilet with Kei Igawa, but weren't savvy to Chapman?

    The Mets signed Ryota Igarashi and came in second in the bidding for Matsuzaka, but didn't make a bold move for Chapman?

    How could they not see it? 

    The Reds spent a fair amount of money on Chapman and it was a gamble, especially for a mid-market team with a budget; but look at what they got. The Cuban pitchers are generally durable, fearless and love to compete. Contreras and Hideki Irabu were disasters for the Yankees, but that shouldn't dissuade them from separating people for reasons other than past mistakes. Rather than spending money on the likes of Stephen Strasburg or any of the above pitchers, wouldn't Chapman's 6-year, $30 million contract been a better investment in every possible permutation? The buzz; his (reported) age; that he's lefty; and the Cuban history of health all make him a no-brainer.

    Maybe teams need to not only re-think their spending/scouting practices, but perhaps ask El Duque, Chapman, Livan Hernandez, Luis Tiant or any other Cuban pitcher what it is they did that made them able to pitch so effectively and deeply into games with few arm injuries. Considering the number of injuries that pop up due to the "expertise" and "optimal mechanics" taught today, how much worse would it be to copy what works rather than what pops up on a computer?

• He's gone. Let it go:

    Why is it that people despise Jeff Francoeur to this degree?

    You saw it with the Braves and their fans after he was dumped on the Mets for Ryan Church and now it's happening again with Francoeur having been traded to the Rangers for Joaquin Arias.

    Francoeur is a player who his detractors love to flog for reasons that are very difficult to understand. He is what he is. He could be more than that; he could be a very solid to star player if he ever hooks up with a hitting coach or psychiatrist or someone who can alter his mindset from the aggressive, hack-hack-hack away hitter he's been since forever. He's still salvageable. Naysayers don't want to hear that, but it's true. Of course there's a difference between him being fixed and his potential for being fixed, but the talent is there. 

    He's with the Rangers now. The hitting heaven of Texas might make him look better as it has with about every hitter whose gone there. He's gone. Mets fans wanted him gone just like Braves fans wanted him gone. Some are saying they appreciated his hustle, smile and attitude while being pleased he's out the door; others are savaging him.

    I don't get it.

    The Braves are responsible for Francoeur just much as Francoeur himself. Rather than try to wean him from his penchant for swinging at everything, they looked at the fact he was getting hits and producing runs, shrugged and kept promoting him; naturally the flaws were exploited in the big leagues (as flaws always are) and he struggled to the point where they dispatched him. The same thing happened with the Mets. Francoeur will be shielded in a better lineup in Texas; they'll be able to bat him lower in the lineup and not worry about his rally-killing double-plays, strikeouts, absence of walks, and streakiness.

    Now we're hearing complaints on what the Mets got back for him. Joaquin Arias has nothing to do with anything. He's a live body. He can play the infield. What's the difference? Francoeur is gone just like they wanted, so who cares what they got for him? One ridiculous suggestion is that the Mets acquired Arias because he's Latin and GM Omar Minaya prefers bringing in Latin players.

    Idiocy.

    I'm wondering if the complaints would be the same had the Mets traded Francoeur for a ballbag or a clipboard and the ballbag or clipboard weren't white. 

    Francoeur is not a Met any longer.

    Get over it. 

• Viewer Mail 9.1.2010:

Gabriel (Capo) writes RE the Mets, Blue Jays, Alex Anthopoulos and Kenny Williams:

I also enjoy Kenny Williams' style, even if I don't like the White Sox.

Vernon Wells for K-Rod and Castillo might make some sense, but I think Anthopoulos might want to swap some prospects in the process.

    It's not only his style, but Williams is totally disinterested in what people say and think about him. Or to put it in better terms, "You may hate me, but you will respect me!!!"

    Regarding Wells, the only way that would make financial sense for the Mets is if the Blue Jays took Carlos Beltran, Francisco Rodriguez, Castillo and Oliver Perez and threw in one of their young pitchers (I like Marc Rzepczynski) to sweeten the deal. That's the only way I'd do it.

Jeff (Street Boss) at Red State Blue State writes RE Billy Beane:

Your analysis is accurate, leaving me to think Beane is even more un-Brad Pitt like than I originally thought.

    I gotta see that movie if and when it comes out. My guess is the stat zombies will have a fit at the way it's altered from what they wanted; people like us will laugh and laugh and laugh at how ludicrous it is; and there will be a segment who have a fanboy appreciation to the tune of that awful "Kick-Ass" in which it's a non-existent fantasy of the loser hitting it big with the hot chick and fame. 

    Now that I think about it, maybe they should put a rush on it. Beane's going to want to hide someplace when his portrayal is on the big screen; in fact, don't be surprised if he does what Paul DePodesta did recently and refuse to let his name be associated with the project as it comes closer to fruition----if it comes closer to fruition.

Aaron Weiner writes RE Billy Beane and the Athletics:

As an A's fan, I actually enjoy reading your description of Billy Beane's career. I only have one small gripe at what you said about the draft picks. You called them all "negligible contributors." I disagree at this assessment, since several of those names are currently manning the starting rotation that is part of a pitching staff that has the lowest ERA in the AL! Yes they're still young, but they're getting better and may have a couple potential Cy Young candidates in the near future! I think Beane has done a great job at acquiring pitching and if he did even an adequate job at acquiring any hitting, the A's could be in contention for the AL West. Even so, we A's fans are (seemingly always) looking forward to the future of this team and think we may have a shot in 2011 or 2012!

    It's a fair point as to the young pitchers. He also loaded up on volume in trading Joe Blanton, Rich Harden and Huston Street despite some of the arms not working out.

    The Athletics offense is embarrassingly bad and their near .500 record this season is a byproduct of beating up on the Royals, Orioles, Indians and Pirates. The Yankees and Twins have specifically abused them. They don't make the schedule, but it's "objective analysis" at its height in coming to a realistic assessment of what the A's are. If they were in the AL East, they'd be 12 games under .500.

Jane Heller at Confessions of a She-Fan writes RE me, Billy Beane and Moneyball:

So when's the book coming out on this subject? You've already written most of it!

    Ah, publishing.

    The book would sell; I'd be nothing if not entertaining on a book tour (in every conceivable sense); and it would create a buzz about both my stuff, Moneyball and their ridiculous movie. There's no such thing as bad press; so what if my book would rip Michael Lewis's trip to baseball Narnia and Billy Beane's faux genius to shreds? The fallacy of Moneyball is self-evident now!

    I don't want to self-publish this, but will if I have to. I have some ideas on how to create a sensation on the interwebs to benefit everyone connected with it and me by choice or circumstance.

    Possibly the prevailing perception of me as an uncontrollable loose cannon is part of the problem. You know that it's totally off the wall. Anyone----from the people at McFarland who published the novel, to I-Universe----will tell you that while I have my quirks and say and do what I want, I am the easiest writer they could ever deal with anywhere. Very little editing is required and they get the stuff when I say they're going to get the stuff or earlier.

    Contrary to popular belief, I am never out of control.

    I'll keep kicking at the door if they don't want to open it, but it'd be mutually beneficial for everyone if they really looked at me and what I do and opened the door willingly. It's a smart business move if nothing else.

John Seal (West Coast Spiritual Advisor) writes RE Billy Beane and the Athletics:

Thanks for your excellent, fair, and accurate analysis of The Emperor of Hegenberger Road, Billy Beane. Regardless of his successes and failures with the A's, I think he'd be a bad fit for the Mets. And knowing the A's luck, they'd probably send us Ollie Perez as 'compensation' for Beane.

    Thank you, John.

    I cannot imagine the Mets going there anyway. It's a silly idea advanced by people who have no idea what they're talking about in any context on the twin-matters of Beane and the Mets.

    You can have Ollie and keep Beane too!!! I'm just that kinda guy.

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I'm scheduled to be on with Sal at SportsFan Buzz tomorrow.

    That's right.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• A non-partisan, factual look at Billy Beane:

    Since there are still so many misapplied perceptions about Oakland Athletics boss Billy Beane; and he's still considered a top-tier GM based on little other than Moneyball, a few good maneuvers, some inherited talent and luck; and there are many people in the media and public advocating Beane as a reasonable successor to Omar Minaya as Mets GM, it's time to take an evenhanded examination of Beane's tenure in running the Athletics.

    There will be as few mentions of Moneyball as is humanly possible. (Really.)

    Let's take a look.

Rise to power:

    Beane took over a moribund franchise in 1998 replacing Sandy Alderson as GM. Alderson himself had crafted a reputation as a successful administrator based on two things: money and Tony La Russa.

    The Athletics of the late 1980s and early 1990s were built by La Russa and pitching coach Dave Duncan's excellence and owner Walter Haas's disinterest in turning a profit at the expense of fielding a competitive team. The A's were consistently at or near the top of baseball in terms of payroll. Alderson made some excellent trades in acquiring the likes of Rickey Henderson and signing underappreciated contributors like Dave Henderson and Ron Hassey, but to think that Alderson's career was the culmination of a brilliant baseball mind is nonsense.

    All one needs do is look at what happened after the team was sold to Steve Schott, the money was gone, La Russa left and the team collapsed. Alderson is disciplined; he's smart; and he's brutal; he's also fond of fostering factions among his underlings (as the disaster with the Padres proved) in order to maintain command of the various turf battles. 

    Beane rose from advance scout to Alderson's assistant. Beane had walked off the field where he was a backup outfielder on those late 80s A's teams and joined the front office; his scouting acumen and desire were noticed and detailed almost immediately----Sports Illustrated article, Sept. 17, 1990----and he was immediately cast as a future GM.

    Contrary to the cover stories being presented, there wasn't a ruthless rise to power under Alderson making the end result of consolidation and recognition a guarantee once he did take command; instead, Beane was said to follow Alderson around like a baby duck at the meetings and sit by passively, watching. He took over as full-time GM in 1998 and inherited a terrible team which Alderson, doubtlessly, thought was ungovernable and irreparable.

    Naturally, once the A's began winning under Beane, there was Alderson to suggest that he laid the foundation for the turnaround and gave Beane his start. It was this "strawman" (a favored Bill James term for a specious argument that has no basis in reality when dissected) that led to Beane's rampant fame and Alderson's continued employment within baseball. 

    Just like any cover story to sell to the masses----George Washington chopping down the cherry tree and not lying about it; Robin Hood robbing the rich to give to the poor; John F. Kennedy writing "Profiles in Courage"----there's a kernel of truth, but it's not....quite....accurate.

On-field results:

    The 1998 Athletics went 74-88. They were old and slow and packed with journeymen and mediocre youngsters. On the club were two core members of the future contender, Jason Giambi and Miguel Tejada; aside from that, there was little to be excited about as the team looked hopeless.

    Beane had yet to implement his "strategies" based on the sabermetric principles that were the impetus of the club's return to contention and Beane's rise to prominence. In 1999, there were signals for a positive future. Tim Hudson arrived and went 11-2 as a rookie; Giambi became a feared power hitter; and they received above-and-beyond performances from Matt Stairs and John Jaha. They finished the year at 87-75 and second place in the AL West.

    The teams from 2000-2003 were built by Beane's smart maneuvering and the decisions that formed the basis for the future worship he would engender. Giambi evolved into a wrecking machine; the young pitchers Hudson, Mark Mulder and Barry Zito all developed into stars; they had a deep and well-constructed bullpen; and burgeoning lineup forces with Tejada and Eric Chavez. He found contributors in Scott Hatteberg and Cory Lidle. It was Beane's use of statistics and ancillary attributes that led to the success of those teams under a tight payroll and, by proxy, drew the attention of Michael Lewis; attention that sowed the seeds for Moneyball. 

    Every year from 2000-2003 the Athletics won and made the playoffs; and every year they got bounced. Beane used the absurdity "the playoffs are luck" to explain away his team's failures; it was a handy excuse for Beane to absolve himself of blame for a bad ending. Had he been holding up the World Series trophy at the conclusion of any one of those years and stood on the podium in a champagne soaked clubhouse, I have a hard time believing anyone with his ego would utter the words, "we got lucky".

    In 2004, the A's finished one game behind the Angels for the AL West title and missed the playoffs. Hudson and Mulder were growing too expensive to keep; he sensed the window for the group was closing and he started trading his stars to retool.

    2005 was something of a rebuilding year, but the A's still went 88-74; in 2006, they won a surprising division title and knocked the heavily favored Twins out of the ALDS before being swept by the Tigers in the ALCS.

    By 2007, things started coming apart. Since that year, the A's and Beane----no longer able to use the statistically based agenda to find players they could afford because other teams caught onto the act----stumbled back into mediocrity and worse. They haven't won more than 76 games since.

Trades/free agent signings:

    Was it brilliance? 

    Was it luck?

    Was it freedom from accountability and public interest that allowed Beane to do what he wanted initially; then the idea that "the man must know what he's doing" that was a direct result of the accolades to protect him for being held responsible for mistakes?

    Or was it all of the above?

    First, the brilliance.

    Early in his tenure. He specifically made the Mets GM Steve Phillips a victim by getting Terence Long (not great, but okay for a time) for Kenny Rogers; and the big score, Jason Isringhausen for Bill Taylor. He perpetrated an absolute heist in getting Johnny Damon, Mark Ellis and Lidle for Ben Grieve, Angel Berroa and A.J. Hinch (yes; that A.J. Hinch). He got Jermaine Dye for three non-descript minor leaguers; he acquired Dave Justice for Mark Guthrie and Tyler Yates (again from the Mets); Ray Durham for Jon Adkins; Ted Lilly came over for Jeremy Bonderman and Carlos Pena (neither of whom have done much to make that regrettable; Pena was dumped by a bunch of teams before finding a home----through luck----in Tampa); Chad Bradford was acquired from the White Sox for Miguel Olivo; he got Dan Haren and Daric Barton from the Cardinals for Mulder and Mulder's arm blew out 2 years later; Nick Swisher yielded Gio Gonzalez and Ryan Sweeney.

    With free agents, Beane made some major hits like the aforementioned Hatteberg; Marco Scutaro; Jack Cust and Frank Thomas were both looking for mutually advantageous situations----Cust had run out of options with other clubs after failing time and again; Thomas wanted to prove he was healthy and signed an incentive-laden deal, nearly winning the MVP.

    Then there are the bad trades. Milton Bradley behaved himself and was solid for the Athletics, but they gave up Andre Ethier to get him. Aaron Harang was traded for Jose Guillen. Tim Hudson went to the Braves for Dan Meyer, Charles Thomas and Juan Cruz. Haren was sent to the Diamondbacks for a package that included Carlos Gonzalez, but Gonzalez was spun to the Rockies for Matt Holliday, who couldn't handle the American League, got off to a slow start and was traded to the Cardinals for Brett Wallace. Rich Harden was traded to the Cubs for a bunch of bodies.

    With free agents, Beane has been capricious with money and seen it go down the tubes. Ben Sheets was guaranteed $10 million for reasons few seem to understand; Esteban Loaiza received 3-years and $21 million; he inexplicably brought back a shot Giambi before the 2009 season in what was a concession to sentimentality more than hard data; and he signed Coco Crisp before this year. 

    You'll notice that as Beane's reputation and profile increased, teams were at first reluctant to deal with him for fear of getting ripped off; and then didn't want to help him because of his participation in the way Moneyball crafted the storyline of Beane knowing all/everyone else is an idiot. There are more than a few people within baseball who are not unhappy at Beane's struggles and fall from grace in recent years.

The draft:

    I can't discuss the draft without wading into the Moneyball farce. 

    The implication in the book was that Beane and his consigliere Paul DePodesta had found a way to "count cards" in the draft and find baseball players rather than tools guys who looked good in jeans. 

    It's garbage. 

    The self-protective cover story regarding the playoffs being a crapshoot is misapplied; the true crapshoot is the draft. As the Stephen Strasburg injury is proving now, you never, ever know what you're going to get from a prospect; you can put all the pieces in place and insert your young players into the cocoon of history and numbers; provide a motherly, nurturing environment...and they can still fall flat on their faces. 

    The Jeremy Brown case is indicative of this phenomenon. The poster boy for the Beane draft technique was smothered rather than developed and that suffocation is a direct result of Michael Lewis. Because he was "fat" and slow, Brown was kept in the lower echelon of team draft boards, but Beane drafted him in the first round of 2002, got him to take a down-the-line salary and he epitomized the way the Athletics were "reinventing" the draft. In reality, Brown was a good player who might have had a chance to make it in the big leagues if he was more under-the-radar and didn't have Moneyball hanging over his head. He lasted six years in the minors, had a cup of coffee in the big leagues and retired after 2007 at age 27. 

    The Beane hits in the draft list follows. I'm not parsing due to who was in control of the scouting and development; Beane was the GM, he gets credit or blame; players are mentioned based on having some use whether it's in trades or for the A's themselves:

1998: Mark Mulder, Gerald Laird, Tyler Yates, Jon Adkins

1999: Barry Zito, Ryan Ludwick

2000: Rich Harden

2001: Bobby Crosby, Dan Johnson, Jeremy Bonderman

2002: Nick Swisher, Mark Teahen, Joe Blanton, John Baker

2003: Andre Ethier

2004: Huston Street, Kurt Suzuki, Ryan Webb, Dallas Braden

2005: Cliff Pennington, Travis Buck

2006: Trevor Cahill, Andrew Bailey

2007: Sam Demel

2008: Tyson Ross

    I can get into the players they passed on to select the mostly negligible contributors above, but it's pointless. The draft is what it is----a selection of 18-22-year-olds coming from various backgrounds and talent levels whose abilities may grow or flame out as they reach the professional level. The game is so vastly different from the amateurs (with aluminum bats and sliding scales of competition) that there's no ironclad way to determine whether or not a player's skills are going to translate. Then there are maturity factors, personalities, coping skills----all contribute to success or failure. It can be accounted for, but it can't be guaranteed. To imply that Beane had "built a better mousetrap" fit into the myth and had absolutely no basis in reality. 

Treatment of his managers:

    Here's something I truly do not understand. How is it possible to give credit to the GM for the wins and blame to the manager for the losses?

    Art Howe was never a great manager, but he's no worse strategically than Joe Maddon, Bud Black or even Joe Girardi. But Howe has become the epitome of a non-entity and "along for the ride" of an excellent team. Howe's contributions to his teams was more along the line of not scaring the young players into failure and it's an important, but unquantifiable, attribute. He didn't screw it up. The playoff losses from 2000-2002 were not the fault of Art Howe. Beane actually did Howe a favor by letting him out of his contract to take over the Mets in 2003 (financially anyway); yes, Howe's reputation took a beating, but he made an amount of money he never would've gotten from the Athletics or anywhere else. 

    Ken Macha was not popular among the players and Beane never appreciated him as anything more than a function of circumstances. Macha made mostly the correct strategic calls with a noticeable gaffe here and there; but he was at the helm when the A's broke through in the division series and beat the Twins in 2006. Then they got swept by the Tigers and Macha was fired. This was a year after contract negotiations broke off and the A's walked away from Macha only to have the two sides reconcile. Macha was being paid for two years after Beane fired him.

    The floating value of the manager and his disposability has been exemplified by Beane's treatment of his latest manager, Bob Geren. Is Geren's holding onto his job amid the A's performance from 2007 onward anything more than a byproduct of him being Beane's "best" friend? Would any other manager----a middle-manager as they're referred to in stat zombie circles----still be managing the team after an annual 75 wins? The A's were expected to contend in 2009 and didn't; they were expected to contend in 2010 and (despite assertions to the contrary) aren't.

    How is Geren still there?

    By the logic that predicated the dumping of Howe and Macha, shouldn't Geren have been held to the same standard and gotten fired? Is this objectivity or is Beane showing weakness in the reluctance to replace his friend? (And the Athletics teams of recent years have fulfilled their potential for the most part; no other manager would've done much better than Geren has; Geren's a solid enough manager.)

The personality:

    Billy Beane has reached larger-than-life status. Along with the accolades comes a certain amount of responsibility; responsibility he's been hesitant to accept. It's fine when everyone's referring to someone as a genius and they bear no burden for negativity. Beane is a sought after corporate speaker; has parlayed his crafted reputation into an ownership stake in the A's; and can essentially do what he wants because of that persona and the lack of interest inherent with running a team in Oakland. Very few people actually care enough to call him out on his mistakes. 

    Is it any wonder why Beane turned down the opportunity to take over the Red Sox after 2002?*

    *By the way, if you read Moneyball, look at his planned list of moves upon taking over. They included moving Manny Ramirez to permanent DH (precluding the signing of David Ortiz); trading Jason Varitek; and signing the shot Edgardo Alfonzo; oh, and Kevin Youkilis would've been traded to the Athletics as compensation for Beane being let out of his contract. How would the Red Sox have looked then? 

    For Beane, the comfort of being in Oakland was, in part, due to the proximity to his young daughter from whom he was separated after his divorce; part happiness where he was; but it was also due to the lack of consequences for whatever he did. For years after the book and the A's run of playoff appearances, Beane could do whatever he wanted with impunity. If he wanted to fire the manager; clean house of expensive veterans; sign strange free agents; make bizarre trades----all were shielded by his identity as a "genius". 

    Such is no longer the case. 

    As the A's have floundered, new focus is placed on what Beane's actually done and the well of excuses has run dry. Financial constraints only go so far and eventually, there have to be results. The pressure in Boston would've been overwhelming from a fan base that would've expected him to win and win big immediately. Judging from the projected trades/free agent signings, that would not have happened. Then where would he be? 

    Billy Beane was and is a compelling story. 

    He's a smart baseball man.

    But the continued reference to him as the man to fix an organization is misplaced and wrong. There are those ratcheting up the rhetoric against Mets GM Omar Minaya and continually postulating that Beane would be a perfect fit for New York and the Mets. 

    Really?

    In the past 5 years, Minaya has actually done a better job in building a team and farm system than Beane has. Beane would be swallowed up by New York and there would not be the freedom to do whatever he wanted without anyone paying attention or questioning him. Those that are gazing from afar at Beane and wondering what he'd do if he were given control of a team with a payroll double what he has in Oakland need only look at what happened when DePodesta took over the Dodgers and had neither the evaluative skills nor the nuance to deal with everything that involves being a GM in a large market. 

    It's a similar sentiment as when Jeff Torborg was hired to take over the Mets after the 1991 season. There were "experts" in the media saying, "yeah, yeah, yeah!!" and entreating the club to do whatever needed to be done to get the poor-man's La Russa, someone immersed in logic and organization like Torborg, to come and restore order with a disorganized and fading group of stars. Torborg, a nice and intelligent man, was not suited to the cauldron of New York; he couldn't handle the media; was tuned out by the recalcitrant veterans; and went by the "book" to such a degree that he wasn't managing, he was pushing buttons and too often, the wrong buttons. It was only when the expensive package was unwrapped that the faults of Torborg were discovered and he's known as the worst Mets manager in my memory of following the team for over 30 years. 

    Billy Beane would be an expensive failure for the Mets along the lines of Torborg. 

    If the club is truly looking for a replacement for Minaya, there are other names----Mark Shapiro, Gerry Hunsicker, Logan White, Larry Beinfest, Rick Hahn, Bill Stoneman----to speak to before even thinking about Beane. It should not be assistant GM John Ricco and the Mets must not make the same mistake they've made in previous years by acting as if the prospective employee is doing them a favor by taking over and being granted full control of a team with a massive payroll, loyal (but disgusted) fan base, and beautiful new ballpark. 

    While his aptitude for corporate double-talk, adept manner in saying "stuff", but not saying anything at all, and deftness at handling crises will be a vast departure from Minaya's shaky command of the English language and outright discomfort in firing people, Beane would be a better out front organizational representative; but would he be a more effective GM in the imperative area of building the team? 

    No.

    It would take one bad trade or wasteful free agent signing for the fans to turn on him; and the media would quickly lose interest in his "story". 

    Beane is not the man for the Mets and they have to realize this before making another huge mistake in pursuing him with the promise of riches, autonomy and the arrival befitting a conquering king. He's conquered nothing aside from being a propped up demagogue and his risks far outweigh the potential rewards.

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I'm scheduled to be on with Sal at SportsFan Buzz on Thursday. Prepare. Although it won't do you much good.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• "No Mr. Bond, I expect you to die!"

    It's somehow appropriate that the main team color of the Chicago White Sox is black because the way GM Kenny Williams runs his team is eerily reminiscent to the glory days of the original man in black/outlaw of sports, Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis.

     The similarities are striking and apply to the decades in which Davis was at the height of his power and maintained all his faculties. 

    Neither man cares what people say about them, but one would assume that they do want credit for what they do; both are fearless and ruthless; and they have interest in one thing----winning. Negative reputations or age-related decline do not dissuade them from bringing in whoever they feel they need to win; and money is no object. (In Davis's case, that was because he owned the place; in Williams's case, it's because he has the unwavering support of owner Jerry Reinsdorf.) 

    I liken Williams to a James Bond villain, brilliant and cunning. Davis was referred to as "Darth Raider", secretive, paranoid, vindictive, vengeful and successful. With skills at evaluating talent and a history of success, they're nearly mirror images of one another. 

    While Davis has become something of a sad sight, still clinging to power; refusing to let age and infirmity take him out of the public spotlight in running his team as he deteriorates, entering the press room aided by a walker and going on scattershot rants against his enemies, his borderline incoherence is embarrassing to those who remember his as the wiry and intimidating presence he was. He's got his team in a death grip/spiral literally and figuratively. It's somewhat understandable. Al Davis's life was dedicated to football on the whole and the various compartments of the game itself. It's all he knows.

    But that doggedness and iconoclastic personality that drove him all those years won't let him retire; and if he did decide to step down, what would he do with himself? Retirement would be a death and that would, in a way, be worse than a physical death.

    The procurement of players is one of the more glaring common denominators in the two men. In his heyday, Davis was famous for his reclamation projects and squeezing the very last bit of juice out of veterans who were supposedly shot. Believing, as I do and presumably Williams does, that any athlete who's known greatness can rediscover that at any moment and should never have their desire to continue competing brought into question regardless of age, they put that into practice repeatedly. You saw it over the course of Davis's career with Jerry Rice, Jim Plunkett, John Matuszak, Lyle Alzado among many others who'd either flamed out, failed or been dispatched from other venues because of personality/off-field issues and became useful again with the Raiders.

    Williams has exhibited the same strategy. His manager, Ozzie Guillen, is widely perceived as a lunatic (he's not, but that's neither here nor there); the clubhouse is filled with players who ran themselves out of other organizations just by being themselves (A.J. Pierzynski); had off-field issues (Bobby Jenks); floundered (Alex Rios); were considered injury-prone busts (Carlos Quentin); reclamation projects (Freddy Garcia); or were a matter of Williams's talent recognition skills coming to the forefront in the face of shaky results (John Danks, Gavin Floyd).

    There have been instances where it hasn't worked as was the case with Ken Griffey Jr. Williams long coveted Griffey and, despite the player's inability to play an adequate center field nor function as the lineup terror he once was, he traded for him anyway giving up a great arm in Nick Masset. It didn't work. With Williams, if you pointed out this fact, he most likely shrug. 

    How many other GMs would have the security to put with the ancillary stuff and import players who no one else wanted for a variety of reasons and live with the consequences and ridicule?

    There are GMs with the courage to run their teams correctly in the face of public scorn: Larry Beinfest, Andrew Friedman, Theo Epstein, Brain Sabean, Jon Daniels----some are totems to various factional disputes prevalent in baseball today; some are simply ripped and reviled; but how many would do all the things Williams does and say the things he says without fear of reprisal?

    Now Williams is taking another risk by claiming Manny Ramirez from the Dodgers (and apparently getting him by agreeing to do nothing other than take the remaining money on Manny's contract----ESPN Story).

    The White Sox are 4 1/2 games behind the Twins in the AL Central. The Wild Card is not going to be an option because both the Yankees and Rays are 10 games ahead of them. They have to win the division if they want to make the playoffs. Having relied on the light-hitting Mark Kotsay as their primary DH for much of the season, how could they not take a chance on Manny by doing little more than taking his contract? They needed a bat and are weak in terms of tradeable prospects. Having made a major play for Adam Dunn and failing, they jumped on Manny.

    Which Manny are they getting? Is he the injury-prone and disinterested Manny that has made the Dodgers look foolish in the past two years with his PED suspension and frequent lapses on and off the field? Or is it the inspired Manny who, when he wants to play, is still one of the most dangerous and terrifying hitters in all of baseball? He's been hurt and has barely played lately because----presumably----the Dodgers didn't want him to re-injure himself to prevent them from getting rid of him.

    If Manny arrives in Chi-Town healthy enough to contribute and is motivated by whatever motivates Manny (you can venture a guess as to what that might be), if nothing else, he's someone who has to be accounted for in the lineup even if he's not hitting. You can't say that for Kotsay. Does Manny want to play next year? (I'm guessing he does.) Or would he like to end his storied and controversial career with a bang possibly helping the White Sox to the post-season? 

    Much in the same vein as Williams and Davis will literally do anything to win, anything is possible with Manny including the idea that he'll get his Sox confused and think he's going back to Boston. Williams has the freedom----financially and theoretically----to do this. Why not?

    "Just win baby."

    "The deep strike."

    "Commitment to excellence."

    These are all favored statements of Al Davis as he was when he cast his shadow over the NFL with his fondness for litigation and interest in nothing other than being the architect of a championship team and the ego to want to be known as a "genius".

    The same can be said for Kenny Williams----James Bond villain.

• Flinging ideas at the wall (that make financial and practical sense):

    The Mets, as desperate as they are to dispatch troublesome contracts and people, could approach several teams about taking Francisco Rodriguez and other problems that need to be eliminated for them to move forward. Some make sense (Chone Figgins from the Mariners), some don't (Milton Bradley from the same Mariners; or Vernon Wells from the Blue Jays); but here's an idea: K-Rod and Luis Castillo to the Rangers for Michael Young.

    The Rangers have a history of bringing in players with off-field issues and getting production from them as they have with Josh Hamilton; they've been understanding in cases where I wouldn't have been of a similarly generous mind (manger Ron Washington's failed drug test last season), and they could use a veteran closer to shift current closer Neftali Feliz into the starting rotation, which is where his long-term future lies. The money comes close to matching up with the Mets taking on Young's excess. 

    K-Rod is due a guaranteed $15 million with the probability of his $17.5 million performance/health option being activated for 2012. Of course this is all contingent on the Mets losing their attempt at "unguaranteeing" K-Rod's contract for his assault on his father-in-law----the Mets winning the case is an unlikely event.

    Castillo has $6 million on his deal for next year. 

    Young is owed $16 million annually through 2013. 

     Monetarily and logistically, it fits. The Mets would get rid of two players they want out of their sight; they could shift the well-respected Young back to second base (he grew up a Mets fan); and find a new closer. The Rangers would have money free to possibly keep Cliff Lee; Feliz would start; and K-Rod could close. Perhaps they could shift Ian Kinsler to third base to replace Young and play Castillo, whose bat might rejuvenate in the hitter-haven of Texas. 

    There are worse suggestions out there. Much, much worse.

• It's My Father's Ring:

    I posted on my alternate writings site on Saturday if you're interested----It's My Father's Ring.

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I'm scheduled to be on with Sal at SportsFan Buzz on Thursday. Be afraid.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• Smelling blood:

    The Twins are always looking to improve in-season and generally take steps to beef up the bullpen more than any other area. It is with that in mind that they acquired Matt Capps from the Nationals for top prospect Wilson Ramos and Brian Fuentes from the Angels for a player to be named later.

    In what was likely a preview to the way the Twins are going to use their relievers for the playoffs, Fuentes was called upon to get the final out in yesterday's 1-0 win over the Mariners. Nick Blackburn had rolled through the Mariners lineup allowing only 2 hits, but with Russell Branyan at the plate. Twins manager Ron Gardenhire brought in Fuentes. Fuentes struck out Branyan. 

    Because of the wide open American League and evident flaws with each and every team, the Twins have spotted an opening that they're taking steps to exploit. Their bullpen is deep with three pitchers who've closed----Fuentes, Capps and Jon Rauch----to go along with dependable role-pitchers Matt Guerrier, Jesse Crain and Brian Duensing. The injuries to Ron Mahay and Jose Mijares made it necessary to get another lefty and they didn't simply get a situational type like Pedro Feliciano or Doug Slaten, but they got Fuentes. Now they're a major threat to all the potential playoff opponents.

    The Yankees starting pitching is in absolute disarray; the Rays have to contend with a heavy workload placed on their starters, dead spots in their lineup and the shakiness in pressure situations of closer Rafael Soriano; the White Sox bullpen is inconsistent; the Rangers have youth and inexperience in their bullpen and must be silently concerned about Cliff Lee.

    That leaves the Twins.

    Certain teams have a strategy and they stick to it. Winning within a budget and relying on competent starters; good defense; timely, versatile bats; and an interchangeable bullpen, the Twins are in contention every single year. When they've made the playoffs, they've been undone----more than anything else----by injured closer Joe Nathan's meltdowns, mostly against the Yankees. 

    Nathan's hurt.

    They've had to piece it together with Rauch early in the year and now with Capps and Fuentes. Manager Ron Gardenhire would scoff at the suggestion that the Twins may be better off with someone other than Nathan closing. He comes from the Tom Kelly school of simplicity. I remember reading an article in Sports Illustrated from 1992 about the Twins longtime manager Kelly (Gardenhire's mentor and one of the architects of the "Twins Way" that's been so successful) as he tried to explain without condescension why he did certain things. The entire article can be found here.

"I used to try to educate the fans who called in," says T.K. "If they wanted to know why I bat this guy here instead of this guy, I would tell them. Why wouldn't you hit Brian Harper second? He hits so good, and you don't have a second-place hitter. And I would explain to them that while Brian Harper is a tremendous hitter, he is not exactly what you would call adept on the base paths. So now I've hurt their feelings because I'm telling them that they're wrong. 

    "He hits so good" probably wouldn't work with the stat zombies; nor would it placate the fans and media who have a list of reasons why Brian Harper should not have been batting second; in fact, there would be a large segment of "experts" who would suggest better offensive and defensive options behind the plate than Harper. Harper was actually a good all-around player.

    Because of that, if anyone dared to suggest that the club is better off without Nathan, they'd receive eye-rolls and head shakes. But the fact is that the team may be better off in the playoffs without Nathan. Gardenhire isn't a manager who's worried about the second-guessing after the game; he doesn't make his decisions to have an answer for the media and fans. He's not a safety-first automaton as Jeff Torborg was.

    There's still the question if he had Nathan available, would Blackburn have started the ninth inning yesterday? Or would he have gone to the closer because that's what he's supposed to do? The Twins have a chance to truly use a bullpen by committee; and it won't be with a series of journeymen that undid the Red Sox attempt at the system in 2003 as they cost themselves the World Series a year before they won it; it would be with closers who have an idea of what the job entails; and no one----not Capps, Rauch or Fuentes----will have a right nor the audacity to moan about it in the press because they weren't given the save chance. The Twins don't operate that way.

    This is much like the situation when the agent of Francisco Liriano, Greg Genske, was complaining about his client being kept in the minors two years ago despite pitching well enough for a recall (link) and Gardenhire reacted angrily with the following statement:

"I just back into town and I hear all this stuff, and Buster Olney is making my team up now and [Genske] wants to tell me who is going to pitch here," Gardenhire said. "No one is going to tell us who to put on our team and no one on ESPN is going to tell us who should pitch for my team. They haven't been here all year. If they had been down there and seen the guy pitch, and then started talking, that's one thing. But to read stats, that's another thing. I recommend they go down there and watch him pitch, come back with a good report for me and walk into my office."

    The Twins don't want to hear it and don't put up with it. There are clubs in baseball in which the inmates are running the asylum; that is not the case in Minnesota; and the players who could make a case for running things----Joe Mauer----don't.

    Fuentes was used to retire Branyan because it was the correct move. It's something that observers should watch for in October because if Robinson Cano is batting with a chance to wreck the game in the ninth inning and Capps is on the mound, the "closer" is going to be removed in favor of Fuentes. Such would not happen if Nathan were healthy.

    Nathan's injury left the Twins scrambling and forced them to use Rauch; then they bolstered the relief corps further with Capps and Fuentes. It was a devastating blow to lose their All Star closer in the spring, but now it's not looking all that bad anymore because as a direct result they're able to put winning ahead of the assigned roles. If there's a different result in two months than their annual playoff loss, it won't be because of the acquisitions themselves, but because of the alteration in strategy that the injury to Nathan made necessary.

• Maybe Wally Backman is the man for the Mets:

    Gauging the Mets for next year and ignoring the obvious unknowns----whether they'll be able to exchange Luis Castillo for a similar contract; if they can move Francisco Rodriguez; how they're going to configure the outfield; what steps they'll take for the bullpen; how much money the Wilpons have to spend; who's going to be running the baseball operations----one piece of speculation that they might reach into their glory days to bring in the fiery Wally Backman to run the team is gaining steam and making more sense not because it's a gimmick, but because the personnel might be best suited to someone of Backman's style and temperament. 

    Regardless of ancillary factors, the foundation of the 2011 team is set. They lineup will be exorcised of Jeff Francoeur and Castillo; the starting rotation will be intact aside from the addition of a veteran of the Bronson Arroyo, Hiroki Kuroda type; and there will be a few new relievers----Grant Balfour, Scot Shields, Matt Thornton, Scott Linebrink----brought in. With the way the team is set based on speed and defense, they're going to need a manager who is going to be aggressive. Backman is nothing if not aggressive. 

    The Whitey Herzog Cardinals (AKA the Runnin' Redbirds) of the 1980s didn't worry about being caught stealing; they had little power; their starting rotation was full of reclamation projects or rookies; and they had a deep bullpen. They won a title with a Hall of Fame closer in Bruce Sutter; and they got by with an array of reliable relievers and a rookie, Todd Worrell after Sutter left. It was "get on base and run". In order to do that, the manager has to be of the mindset that the hard-charging, go-go-go attitude will be enough of a distraction to the opposing pitcher and defense that the number of times it fails makes it still worth the risk. 

    Is Bob Melvin that type of manager? Is Joe Torre? Is any other name that's bandied about as the Mets 2011 manager, aside from Backman, that personality type? It might only work for a short-time. Like Billy Martin, I'd have concerns that Backman would have a penchant for self-destruction; but for the next couple of years, it's an infusion that fits in with the current construction of the team. 

    The more thoughtful, passive managers in the vein of Melvin and Torre aren't going to give their players the free rein to make those mistakes. Backman would. I remember when the Cardinals had been drastically rebuilt under Herzog in the early 80s and speed was back en vogue, Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, latched onto the idea that speed kills and it's resistance to slumps made it a winning formula, turned the Bronx Bombers into a track meet. He let Reggie Jackson leave and brought in Ken Griffey and Dave Collins to go along with Jerry Mumphrey as "speed" players. The details of the switch can be found in Graig Nettles's book Balls:

When we got to spring training, it was pretty clear we didn't have the kind of speed George was bragging about. Also, if you're going to run, you have to have an aggressive manager, and Bob Lemon is not that type, and neither is Gene Michael. When the season started, we hardly ever stole a base.

    Steinbrenner had a third manager that year, Clyde King, and he wasn't that way either.

    So you had a mishmash of players of negligible talents slammed into an ill-fitting system with a series of managers who didn't encourage the freedom to run, bunt and hit and run. 

    Needless to say, it didn't work.

    The personality required to do such a thing has to be of the John McGraw, Backman, Martin school. Herzog was able to do what he wanted because he was essentially running the team from top-to-bottom; the media wasn't as suffocating then as it is now and the middle-American reporters weren't as vicious as they are in New York----Herzog had them intimidated; and it had worked with the Royals and was working with the Cardinals.

    This is the personnel the Mets have and it can be shaped to fit the ballpark with a tweak here and there. Backman might ignite and then flame out; he might do something that will force the front office to keep a leash on him or even dump him. But in a short burst, it could work. Given the way the team is listless and heading toward a younger group, Backman might be the man to liven things up on and off the field very, very quickly.

• Viewer Mail 8.29.2010:

Kimberly writes RE Stephen Strasburg:

The news about Strasburg is very sad. It is sad in the way that any athlete needing Tommy John (or any other type) surgery would be unfortunate. For some reason, I have some bitterness about Strasburg--but he is completely blameless for my negative feelings. My issue is the overwhelming praise that was heaped on Strasburg before he ever threw a big league pitch. I can't figure out why "sports writers" at ESPN (and elsewhere) feel the need to hype a player like Strasburg to such a nauseating degree. I wonder...is it because they don't want to be late in identifying a future Hall of Famer? Do they worry that they may be caught behind the times? Or could the reason be that they find current sports--current athletes--so boring that they have to create a story where there may not be one?
It's almost like you said in your post--MLB is trying to be like the NFL or NBA. The problem is, while it's easy to predict the NFL potential of a college player, baseball is totally different. So many variables will affect the success of a baseball player. There are no sure things in the MLB. The "experts" don't seem to get this.

    Strasburg's injury is sad in an on-field sense, but in reality, he's an athlete with a great talent and he got hurt. The implication that it's a "tragedy" is pure melodrama. Nick Adenhart was a tragedy. Stephen Strasburg is not a tragedy. What I find funny is the search for citations in warning the masses about Strasburg. Brewers pitching coach Rick Peterson was quoted in Bill Madden's column today....and used it to try and play up his company:

The career-threatening elbow ligament injury to Stephen Strasburg has Rick Peterson, the former Mets pitching coach now with the Brewers, even more flabbergasted that more teams have not taken advantage of the biomechanical analysis clinic he has utilized for years with Dr. James Andrews in Birmingham, Ala. Strasburg's injury was not the product of over-use but rather flaws in his delivery. "An MRI and a physical may reveal the injury, but a biomechanical analysis can tell you the predictability of one and make the chances far greater of correcting those flaws," Peterson said. "Not to do it when you have access to it is insane. It's like buying a used car without Carfax."

    Peterson has a track record of success with pitchers others couldn't reach----Oliver Perez----so he gets a pass for this year's atrocious showing with the Brewers. Perhaps the Strasburg camp should've been more proactive in keeping him healthy by consulting with Peterson/Andrews as a preventative measure.

    ESPN had a stake in Strasburg because any mention of the phenom meant clicking on the stories; web traffic; viewership increases; and raised advertising revenue from the attention. The Nationals wanted to have an ace at the top of their rotation of course, but they too wanted to benefit from such a larger-than-life character.

    Credible people like Peterson have a right to speak out, but the leeches are appearing now with their, "I knew his motion was ripe for TJ" borderline gloating after the fact. In a way, they're worse than those who anointed Strasburg before he'd made it to the big leagues and looked dominant because they were silent until it was safe to start crowing. "Could Strasburg's injury have been foreseen and prevented?" will be the new storyline.

    One thing feeds into the other and it's unstoppable. It's going to happen again. And again. And again. And again. Not much thought goes into the hype and when there's money involved? Watch out. 

• New stuff:

    I posted some new stuff yesterday on my alternate writing site----It's My Father's Ring----if anyone's interested.

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I was a guest a week ago Thursday with Sal at SportsFan Buzz. You can click the link to Sal's site to download the Podcast or listen directly here. Also, check Sal's Facebook page here.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• Tommy John is a who, not a what:

    Because it's placed into applicable terms, kids who some middle-school teachers would insist  have trouble spelling the word "cat" can explain why their favorite NBA/NFL stars need to have knee surgery; they can differentiate between the ACL and MCL and comprehend what it means to the player and team.

    On the same token there are presumably thousands of people who know the name "Tommy John" as the moniker for ligament replacement surgery on a pitcher's elbow; but they don't know that there was a person named Tommy John who crafted a borderline Hall of Fame career as a pitcher and should be in the Hall of Fame for the combination his on-field work and that his recovery from the surgery that now bears his name has become so prevalent and saved the careers of such a vast number of star pitchers and players.

    With Nationals rookie Stephen Strasburg the latest name to be diagnosed with the dreaded tear of the ulnar collateral ligament in his elbow and requiring the procedure, perhaps it's time to give more credit to Tommy John; it was John along with surgeon Frank Jobe---who did the cut and paste----and revolutionized the game.

    Years ago, when he was with the Yankees in the years after his return, his elbow was referred to as "bionic". John had been a good sinkerball pitcher with the White Sox in the 60s and was traded to the Dodgers (for Dick Allen) in 1971. With the Dodgers, John was 40-15 in nearly three seasons before blowing out his elbow. Faced with the prospect of his career being over or trying to salvage something from his career----having a ligament transferred from his forearm to his elbow----John opted for the experiment.

    It took a year for him to rehab and, as is the case with something new, no one expected him to make it back. It's scoffed at; ridiculed; disbelieved....until it works. 

    After a 10-10 record in 1976 for the Dodgers (judging from his Gamelogs, he pitched in some hard luck), he won 20 games for the first time in his career in 1977 at the age of 34 for the National League champs. He signed with the Yankees in November of 1978 for 3-years and $1.4 million (it was a lot of money then) and became one of the top pitchers in the American League. He gobbled innings, pitched deeply into games and won. In his first go-round with the Yankees, he had a record of 62-36 and finished 2nd and 4th in the AL Cy Young voting in 1979-80. 

    John moved on to the Angels, Athletics and back to the Yankees in his 40s. He started on opening day in 1989 out of necessity----and not long after new Yankees manager Dallas Green questioned how much he could contribute with his diminished stuff. He won that game too.

    Relying on a simple, repeatable motion and a sinker/slider repertoire (along with being accused of throwing a spitball; or a scuffball; or a spit-scuffball), John is close to the Hall of Fame without the now commonplace surgery. His comparables on Baseball-Reference are either in the Hall of Fame or will be in the Hall of Fame. The only exception is Jim Kaat whose lofty win total is due more to his durability and hanging around for 25 years than any Hall of Fame quality work.

    Adding the surgery and how his desperation to continue his career led him to take part in what was then an experiment, John belongs in the Hall of Fame as something more than an objectified thing whose name is only known because of the surgery.

    In the framework of importance to the game, you can make the argument that he's done as much for baseball and baseball players as Curt Flood. What he accomplished was at least as imperative and perhaps more. It was because of Flood that the free agency/reserve clause foundation began to crack and eventually broke; but judging by the money made by stars who've undergone the surgery and returned----John Smoltz, Tim Hudson, Josh Johnson, Chris Carpenter and countless others----is John truly appreciated?  

    He deserves an honorific of greater note than having his name repeated again and again, tossed in as a meaningless footnote. The same argument that says Flood belongs in the Hall of Fame applies to Tommy John as well.

• And now Strasburg:

    Simplistic arguments against the caution taken with young pitchers (advanced by the likes of the soon-to-be-unemployed Rob Dibble) will pop up everywhere now that Strasburg is headed for "You Know Who" surgery. Of course, in all silly arguments there's a crumb of truth despite the way they're spun out of control by the agenda-driven and ignorant. 

    It can't be lost, however, on anyone who's witnessed Strasburg's rise and fall that nothing could've been done to prevent this injury from happening. The worst part of this----in many eyes----is the absence of blame for the ghost of fate and reality of biomechanics. Armchair experts will pop up everywhere saying, "we knew this would happen" based on a myriad of hindsight-aided signals. His motion; his 103 mph fastball; his diet; his genetics; his whatever----all will be placed in the narrative as to why this was unavoidable.

    It was unavoidable, but not for those reasons.

    It was unavoidable because it was unavoidable.

    The Nationals, San Diego State, his parents and everyone involved with Strasburg from the time his talent began to manifest itself until now were nothing but judicious in his handling and he still got hurt. Because of the success rate in "You Know Who" surgery, Strasburg will be back; he'll be just as good as he was when he arrived in the big leagues under a spotlight that couldn't have been more glaring had he landed from Krypton; and he'll again be firing his fastballs, curves and change-ups.

    But is it worth it?

    Is it worth all the money they gave him just for signing his name? Is it worth all the paranoia that permeated the weapon's deployment? All the dissection, interference and fear?

    On some level, there might be a bit of relief on the part of Strasburg, the Nationals and everyone else that his elbow blew. No one will own up to that of course, but like a hopelessly ill and dying loved one whose existence is a war of attrition amid the knowledge that it's not going to get better; or like the relief that's exhibited by one who is living a lie when they're finally found out, it happened. All the protection and scrutiny didn't help. Now he's gone for at least a year. What we'll now have is one side (the Dibbles) ranting and raving about the babying of pitchers; and the other side (the Verduccis) citing research indicative of how injuries occur because of whatever numbers pop out of a computer.

    If I were Nationals GM Mike Rizzo, manager Jim Riggleman and pitching coach Steve McCatty, it would be comforting to know, on a personal level, that I'm not going to get roasted for Strasburg getting hurt. He'll be back; perhaps the expectations and spotlight will be tempered and he'll function as a human being rather than a freak of nature whose body couldn't hold up to the stress placed upon it by circumstances on and off the field.

• Why MLB should allow the trading of draft picks:

    Another aspect of the Strasburg injury and the litany of number one draft picks (many of whom were pitchers) who've failed is the money. The Nationals gave Strasburg a guaranteed $15.1 million to sign on the dotted line. The value of the pitcher will be known in retrospect. He's raised ticket sales; brought attention to a team about whom no one cared or noticed; and still will have the potential for greatness once he gets back. Eventually, he could front a championship rotation. 

    But in a business sense, was it worth it? For a team that's cold-blooded and fearless, could they have taken the advantage inherent with holding the first pick in a year where the best available player was so clear cut and spun it into a bounty of other players and down-the-line picks to craft a championship team more quickly and inexpensively? 

    It's difficult to transfer the NFL and NHL to baseball, but could the Nationals have decided that it would behoove them to trade the pick and accumulate a stack of players and draft picks as the Dallas Cowboys did when they traded Herschel Walker to the Minnesota Vikings and laid the foundation for three Super Bowl champions? Or the Quebec Nordiques who dealt Eric Lindros to the Philiadelphia Flyers and acquired the players, money and picks to build a long term contender in Quebec and after they moved to Colorado?*

*I'm not sure who it was, but when discussing the anti-Lindos sentiment in Quebec, someone from the Nordiques----a player----said something like, "I dunno why Quebec hates the guy so much; look how good we are because of him," and he was right.

    So, what would've happened if the Red Sox, Yankees or Mets were after Strasburg and anted up players and picks to get him? If the Red Sox packaged Clay Buchholz, Daniel Bard, other low-level prospects and say 3 subsequent first round draft picks? Or the Yankees gave Joba Chamberlain, Ivan Nova, Jesus Montero, draft picks and cash? Or the Mets Jenrry Mejia, Jon Niese, Ike Davis, picks and money? Wouldn't the Nationals have been better off in the long and short run? 

    MLB is trying to drum up interest in the draft. People with no discernible skills at evaluating talent are treating the draft as their ticket to notoriety and becoming the next Mel Kiper Jr. in turning those few days into a lucrative career. Commissioner Bud Selig ambles out to the podium in the empty, echo-chamber studio, with his ill-fitting suit, floppy $5 haircut, cheap glasses and non-existent personality to announce the names as if there's supposed to be a passionate reaction around the world as they're called.

    It hasn't worked.

    Trading the picks would work. It would create buzz. And it would give the smarter and more gutsy teams a better chance to compete.

    If the Strasburg injury spurs such a consideration, maybe it can evolve into what they hope it will be. You want to turn the draft into an event? That's how to do it. Knowing MLB, they'll eventually acquiesce to the suggestion----in 2030. In this case, it won't be better late than never; it'll be, "Oh? Really? Whatever."

• Viewer Mail 8.28.2010:

Jane Heller at Confessions of a She-Fan writes RE Stephen Strasburg:

Strasburg is having Tommy John surgery??? That's horrible news for him, for the Nationals and for baseball. So much hope was placed on his shoulders (literally), but he got people excited about the game and not just in the DC area. Very sorry to hear that.

    A negative can be turned into a positive. It wasn't fair to place all the hopes of the Nationals franchise and baseball in general over the head of a 23-year-old kid. If he hadn't gotten hurt, it could've degenerated into a Todd Marinovich/Tiger Woods-style disaster of off-field acting out. Now maybe he can relax a bit and be a human being instead of this "thing".

Joe writes RE Jason Bay and Carlos Beltran:

Beltran was also a much better player than Bay.

    Exactly my point. Beltran's a better player and more was expected from him, especially after the coma he was in as he ripped everything in sight in the 2004 playoffs for the Astros. Bay, had he not gotten hurt, would've ended up with something close to the 16 homers; 76 RBI; .266 BA; .330 OBP that Beltran posted in 2005. Bobby Bonilla----with all the off-field incidents with the Mets----did produce in later years after a nightmarish 1992. I'd expect a similar correction from Bay. 

Jeff (Acting Boss) at Red State Blue State writes RE Strasburg and the Cardinals:

Even I'm upset by the Strasburg news. Watching him pitch this season has been a real joy. Now I have to wait over a year? NO!!!

And you're right about the Cardinals. Watching them every day has become a real chore; not only do they baffle with inconsistency, but they just don't look like a team with a purpose. They look like zombies.

    The Cardinals had better get themselves together. The Reds are not going away. 

Joe writes in response to Jeff's use of the word "zombie":

They look like zombies, Jeff? They must really know their baseball then :)

    There's a difference between a stat zombie and a regular, run-of-the-mill walking undead zombie; there are also the 28 Days Later, running, rage-fueled zombies. One day, I'll need to compartmentalize zombies and their hallmarks. 

The Brooklyn Trolley Blogger (Brooklyn Capo) writes RE Dusty Baker, Joe Girardi and Brian Cashman:

Dusty Baker is working with a new dynamic; a very young hungry team taking the lead with smart vets (Rolen etc) in support. That wasn't always the case with Dusty in S.F. and ChiTown. It's a new wrinkle for him.
Girardi? Hmmm. Ever get the feeling it's Cashman who isn't necessarily sold on Joe and wouldn't mind seeing him walk away?
I do. Cashman has gotten colder and bolder since he was able to delete Team Tamper in Tampa and convince BOSS his plan should be followed. I look at Cashman and Hal, and then I see Girardi being the odd man out.

    Baker likes his veterans, but he has used youngsters when necessary. The Giants were constructed under the premise of "Build around Barry" with Barry Bonds and that's what they did. And they won.

    The Cubs were slapped with a mandate of "win now" and they came close. This is why it's unfair to blame Baker for what happened with Mark Prior and Kerry Wood. It was either try to win and push them to make the playoffs, worrying about their arms later; or develop pitchers and make winning secondary. What was he supposed to do?

    To hold him up as responsible for an organizational decision is the essence of passing the buck to a convenient target.

    My hunch is that Cashman wants to keep Girardi; will offer a fair 3-year contract and have people in mind if negotiations break down or Girardi tries to use the Cubs as a lever to get a longer, more lucrative deal. I'd put the chance of Girardi leaving at about 30%. (Everyone else pulls percentages from their behinds; why not me too?)

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I was a guest a week ago Thursday with Sal at SportsFan Buzz. You can click the link to Sal's site to download the Podcast or listen directly here. Also, check Sal's Facebook page here.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• Truths, hard and cold:

    Reality is (or should be) setting in for certain teams that have to realize that their aspirations are unlikely to come true this year. They could've been for 2010; they could be for a bright future; or they could've been for long-term stability.

    As the maladies are diagnosed and barring a drastic turnaround, a bitter pill could be on the medical tray to cure what ails them----if they choose to take it. That doesn't make the situation any easier to come to terms with; but truth is what it is. It has to be told.

    It's a dirty job, but someone's gotta do it.

    Let's take a look.

Something's still not right with the Cardinals.

    With the way the Reds have shown such an ability to rebound----a must for any contending team----the Cardinals have to play better than this; they have to win games against bad teams; and they can't have their closer blowing games after his team took a lead in the ninth inning. 

    But that's exactly what happened with Ryan Franklin in the Cardinals 11-10 loss to the Nationals.

    Franklin isn't an arsonist as a closer as are others----Huston Street for example----he's respectable enough and will rack up most of his save opportunities; but it's the high-profile gacks that have cost the Cardinals dearly this season. Most notably the bashing he took on July 6th in Colorado against the Rockies as the Cardinals blew a 6-run lead in the ninth inning and lost. Then there was last night's loss to the Nationals.

    The most reliable closers blow games----even Mariano Rivera----but to be in the Cardinals position, fighting for a division title against a feisty Reds team whose confidence is rising by the day, these losses can mean the difference between making and missing the playoffs.

    All seemed well after the 3-game sweep in Cincinnati as they caught the front-running Reds; then they won their next game against the Cubs to take a one game lead in the division; but they've staggered since by dropping 5 games in the standings in two weeks.

    Something's off with the Cardinals. They were flawed at the season's start; very top heavy and reliant on question marks in important roles. Most importantly is the closer spot with Franklin.

    Because manager Tony La Russa is credited/blamed for the use of players in their designated "roles", specifically in the bullpen, it's automatically assumed that he has a clear vision of who should be his closer. If you look at his managerial history, he's had some big time, reliable men for any and all circumstances like Dennis Eckersley; but for the most part with the Cardinals, he's had a relatively lesser-known and somewhat mediocre array of journeymen whom he installed as the closer by accident or because he'd run out of other options.

    The Cardinals closers under La Russa have been: Eckersley (at the tail end of his career); Juan Acevedo, Jeff Brantley, Ricky Bottalico, Dave Veres, Jason Isringhausen and Franklin. The only one among that crew who could be considered top tier was Isringhausen and he was notoriously shaky having been removed from the role at various times in his career.

    One can raise the question whether the Cardinals would have won their one title under La Russa in 2006 had they not been retrospectively lucky with Isringhausen getting injured; they were forced to stick Adam Wainwright into the role for September and into the playoffs. If Isringhausen hadn't gotten hurt, would they have made the playoffs at all?

    For all the aforementioned criticism aimed at La Russa for his game-changing strategies, he's been the epitome of the "any guy can rack up the saves" strategy; he relies more on their mental capacity for doing the job than blow-away stuff. This is how Veres, Brantley and Franklin were trusted in the role.

    Make no mistake about it, the Cardinals are in trouble because the Reds aren't afraid of them, the Wild Card isn't going to be an option and there's something off with the whole demeanor of the club. If they want to make a legitimate run back into World Series contention (and I picked them for the pennant this year), they'd better figure out what the issue is and fix it. Quick.

The Nationals are in shellshock on and off the field. 

    Reeling as an organization on and off the field, the Nationals are scheduled to discuss the Stephen Strasburg injury and his future later today (and it's coming out as I write this that he needs Tommy John surgery). There's an overall aura of devastation hovering around the club. It's understandable and made worse by the precautions that were taken with Strasburg's valuable right arm and that he got hurt anyway.

    There's little that can be done about it now and no one to blame. All they can do is hope to have the pitcher ready for late 2011. The Nationals performed their due diligence in keeping Strasburg healthy, they treated him gently and with rules, regulations and usage guidelines. He was protected and got hurt. The only thing they can do now is wait and hope.

    Too much hope was placed on Strasburg. The Nationals made some overly aggressive signings this season in the interest of running before they could walk. Jason Marquis was money tossed into the trash; they did quite well with their investment in Matt Capps as they got themselves a catcher for the future by trading Capps to the Twins for Wilson Ramos.

    They played respectably early in the season, but a lack of talent in the starting rotation; overuse of the bullpen; and lack of depth in the lineup reduced them to what they are----20 games under .500.

    Now they're in a holding pattern with Strasburg. It's hard to build an entire future around one player, especially a pitcher and the risks inherent with the strategy are coming to fruition now. 

    On another note regarding the Nationals, in what appears to be misplaced anger, broadcaster Rob Dibble invited the ire of GM Mike Rizzo with his ridiculous comments in relation to Strasburg pitching through the pain----Washington Post Blog. 

    This is weeks after Dibble offered an apology for some chauvinistic on-air statements about women attending games. You can choose to believe his apology if you want, but anyone who's paid attention to Dibble's career as a player and in various media capacities should know better.

    Now, he's been given a few days off from his broadcasting duties. It would be a shock if he's working for the Nationals next season.

    That said, what precisely did the Nationals expect from Dibble? He's not exactly the most thoughtful person in the world and he's only in broadcasting because he says outrageous things without thinking about them. He was a bully as a player and he's been a loose cannon as a broadcaster. That's what the Nationals hired and that's what they got.

Joe Girardi is flirting with the Cubs.

    Amid all the other things they're dealing with, the Yankees can't be happy about the way manager Joe Girardi has refused to dismiss the rumors that he's the perfect fit for the Chicago Cubs managerial opening. It's a similar feeling as when then-New York Jets coach Herman Edwards was repeatedly mentioned as a possibility to take over the Kansas City Chiefs to replace the retiring Dick Vermeil; or as then-Miami Dolphins coach Nick Saban was linked with the University of Alabama job----they brushed it away, dismissed it...and then took the jobs.

    Does Girardi want to leave the Yankees? Would he feel more comfortable back home in Illinois with his original club? Is he tired of the constant questioning of his strategies and handling the egos in his clubhouse while being unappreciated and cast as a front office puppet who's easily replaceable?

    Probably.

    Would the Cubs job be easier? Well, the expectations would be lessened and no one would give him a hard time if the team failed because they're so accustomed to it. This is partially a negotiating ploy; partially a homesickness; and partially Girardi being tired from the stress of managing the Yankees. 

    He wouldn't have the chance to win with the Cubs that he does with the Yankees; and he certainly wouldn't make the money he's going to make with the Yankees.

    As I said days ago, Girardi had better be careful because in much the same way the Yankees  under Brian Cashman, Hank and Hal Steinbrenner thanked Johnny Damon and Hideki Matsui for their service and let them leave, they won't go crazy to keep Girardi if negotiations grow contentious.

    They're probably not all that thrilled that he's even answering questions about the Cubs to begin with. It's hard to see him leaving, but it's not something to treat as impossible either.

• Viewer Mail 8.27.2010:

Max Stevens at The Lonely One writes RE Adam Rubin, Omar Minaya and the Mets: 

Your critique of Adam Rubin is excellent. One of the most interesting aspects of your piece today is that the more coherent case you make against Minaya and the Mets - even if only to show what a coherent case would look like - is spot on, and I found very little to disagree with.  I agree with you that a lot of the Met bashing is over the top.  Somehow, Met bashing started to take on a life of its own after the club got bounced in the 2006 NLCS.  Since then, every little mistake has been magnified by the media, and the dominant narrative has become that the Mets are an organization that can't get out of its own way.  Some of this is deserved, but a lot of it also seems like it's put out there to increase readership.  Bad news and controversy sell.

    It's sometimes worse when the Mets are playing well. You'd think that the bashers would have other objects of their vitriol upon which to jump. The Cubs are an easier target; the Angels have been as inconsistent as the Mets; the Dodgers floundering, the Mariners disastrous----why is it always the Mets who are the easy target?

    I have to say this about Adam Rubin----he has my respect. He didn't respond angrily; he re-tweeted the link to my posting on Twitter despite my ripping him; and he didn't block me from following him like his weak brethren Joel Sherman and Jon Heyman; and he doesn't make snide private comments to me like Ken Davidoff has. 

    I never said Rubin was wrong to be angry at Omar Minaya. In fact, he rightly broke the stories about Tony Bernazard's inappropriate behaviors; it was only after the fact that people like WFAN's Ed Coleman came out publicly with his own "Bernazard stories".

    Rubin was just doing his job in that respect, but there's a credibility gap when it's an every...single....day out-of-context splay of machine gun fire at the whole organization.

Jane Heller at Confessions of a She-Fan writes RE Adam Rubin:

Ah, but look at how Rubin/ESPN got you to write an entire blog post about his three-part series.

    I doubt he cares. 

Jeff (Acting Boss) at Red State Blue State writes RE Adam Rubin and ESPN:

Adam who?

Worldwide Leader in what?

I don't even waste my time with them anymore.

    I suppose it's a byproduct of absolute power corrupting absolutely. ESPN, the teams, the athletes and their agents and gadflies are in a mutually beneficial relationship which undermines any and all objectivity in reporting. No one says anything substantial anymore because they have a clear agenda.

Joe writes RE Jason Bay:

Actually there were legitimate arguments against signing Bay. But no one could foresee him struggling this much in year one. And of course the concussion could not be predicted either.

    In a worst case scenario, bearing in mind the adjustment to New York and Citi Field, the Mets had to have accounted for at least 20-25 homers and 90-100 RBI from Bay. The Mets needed to make a splash; get a power bat; and accumulate some good will with the fans by bringing in a recognizable name. They did that. It hasn't worked out so far, but it's only year one. Carlos Beltran was a nightmare in his first year in New York as well; Bay can redeem himself with a better supporting cast and year under his belt in the city. His struggle isn't due to lack of effort. 

The Brooklyn Trolley Blogger (Brooklyn Capo) writes RE Adam Rubin and the Mets:

Over the last two days Joel Sherman and Rubin decided they want to catch up with yesterday's news? That's my angle; especially with Sherman on Tuesday. I don't begrudge Rubin for lambasting the Mets in three parts. We all do it. All that stuff he said is on the record and duly noted. His content usage was debatable but his context was all wrong. I accept some of the things he said at face value, but it is really hard to ignore his vindictiveness towards Omar. I think you could have brought down the heat by one degree (just one)...but in Rubin's case I guess what's good for the Goose is good for....

    I don't think I went over the top, but maybe you're right. Rubin's viciousness has been going on for a year now and is so obvious that it had to be addressed. He's going to get his wish and it's becoming clear that Minaya is going to be transferred in the organization to a different role.

    Had he omitted the silliness like blaming the club for Dwight Gooden, Francisco Rodriguez and Johan Santana and presented his case, no one could argue with the conclusion that the team appears to be in disarray. Trying to fold everything into one giant cesspool is easy, but inaccurate. What he wrote may have been true in a sense, but it wasn't fair.

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I was a guest eight days ago with Sal at SportsFan Buzz. You can click the link to Sal's site to download the Podcast or listen directly here. Also, check Sal's Facebook page here.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• Badly written, twisted and poorly executed:

    Any well-planned scheme has to be admired even if it's unprofessional and agenda-driven sludge disguised as investigative reporting and well-thought-out analysis. But when it's on a prominent platform, transparent and badly done, it's not worthy of respect in any sense at all.

    Such is the case with ESPN New York's Mets beat reporter Adam Rubin and his vindictive three-part attack perpetrated against the club. In a vengeful series of shaky premises, clumsy analogies and selective use of facts to support his hypothesis, Rubin does what he's done for the better part of a year in savaging the Mets due to a combination of convenience to public perception and a desire to retaliate for a wrong done to him personally.

    As has become a hallmark of ESPN on the whole, there's very little interest in factual reporting; rather, Rubin chooses to toss everything into one big pile and try to formulate an unimpeachable indictment of the club from the ownership all the way down to off-field security practices and former players who've fallen on hard times. What results is a patchwork quilt of viciousness.

    The entire three part series can be read here: Part I, Part II, Part III.

    There are so many concepts in the piece of "journalism" that one wonders if Rubin has a free hand at ESPN to do whatever he wants; a word number he had to reach like a high schooler writing an essay; or is so immersed in his hatred for Minaya and the Mets that content is largely irrelevant in the pursuit of his own ends. 

    ESPN long ago became a farce in terms of reporting. They neither care nor seek to improve their coverage. Everything they do is in the interests of pushing their brand; if it's at the expense of truth, who cares? But how is it possible for an entity that refers to itself as the "Worldwide Leader in Sports" to allow such slipshod and self-centered essays disguised as inside information? Are inaccuracies in both spirit and hard data acceptable when written by someone who is ostensibly there to provide objective coverage? Perhaps ESPN should change their slogan to: "ESPN---Expect Nothing". 

    The Rubin piece is poorly written and selective with citations in the interest of his intended conclusion, reality be damned. If fact didn't fit into the body, then it was twisted or eliminated. The most glaring instances of picking and choosing that which fits into his argument most conveniently are the allegations of the Wilpons' financial troubles due to the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme; the lack of young talent in the organization; the blame laid on the club for off-field incidents present and past; and failures by acquisitions that made sense at the time and haven't worked as planned.

     Mining for facts which bolster the premise of the author is not reporting. If one wants to make a cogent case for changing the entire baseball operation from the GM to the manager, it's easy to do without the self-justifying savagery. 

    Here's the case:

    Since Omar Minaya took over as GM, from his first full season on, the Mets have spent approximately $737 million on big league payroll. In that time, they've made the playoffs once----in 2006 where they lost in game 7 of the NLCS.

    They collapsed in both 2007 and 2008, blowing playoff spots that should've been assured in part due to poor depth to account for injuries to aging veterans. In 2009, the team endured a list of injuries that bordered on ridiculous in their variety and scope and the minor league system was unprepared to provide any competence whatsoever for the missing players. The Mets failure in this case has been brought into greater focus by the list of All Stars lost by both the Red Sox and Phillies in 2010 and that both teams have been able to stay in contention.

    Minaya made several poor trades in which he dealt away useful pieces Heath Bell, Brian Bannister, Matt Lindstrom and Xavier Nady in exchange for the likes of Jon Adkins, Ambiorix Burgos, Jason Vargas, Roberto Hernandez and Oliver Perez. Free agent signings were expensive and poor with Scott Schoeneweis, Fernando Tatis and Jason Bay; plus the retention of Perez, Guillermo Mota and Luis Castillo for over-priced contracts.

    The team medical protocol was dangerous to the players and embarrassing to the team with Ryan Church, Carlos Beltran and Jose Reyes being the most egregious examples of inaction or misdiagnosis.

    Trusted assistant Tony Bernazard was allowed to run roughshod over the organization in general and throughout baseball in particular with his misanthropic, self-promoting and abusive behaviors. That Bernazard was a reviled detriment was clear to everyone but Minaya and Jeff Wilpon and they kept him until they had no choice but to fire him after several high-profile incidents including tearing off his shirt and screaming at minor league players and a near fight with closer Francisco Rodriguez.

    The clumsy dismissal of Willie Randolph and continued language gaffes with the press have undermined Minaya's charisma and likability and made clear that a better communicator would be a more palatable front man for the organization on and off the field, in player procurement and practicality of being a GM in baseball today.

    But the most telling aspect of this case and clearest window into Rubin's goal is that Minaya perpetrated an idiotic and ill-thought-out attack against one Adam Rubin in an attempt to defend his fired friend Bernazard.

     There it is.

     A clean, coherent series of reasons to replace Minaya based on fact and not innuendo without the cherry-picking to add to the list of charges in the interest of piling on. 

    Rubin doesn't have the integrity to disclose the fact that, yeah, he'd like to get back at Minaya for impugning his intentions with a ridiculous assertion that Rubin himself wanted a place in the organization as a possible replacement for Bernazard; nor does he have the skills to write his rip-piece in an aboveboard manner by admitting as such and saying, "regardless of my personal antipathy towards Minaya and the Mets, how can you argue with the facts in this case?"

    Of course there are defenses for some of the Minaya decisions that haven't panned out. 

    As fantastic as Bell's been with the Padres and his anger-fueled "they never gave me a chance" complaints against the Mets, they're unfounded; they did give him a chance and he wasn't any good. Bannister has become a useful starter for the Royals, but the decision to trade him had to do with an assessment of talent----his stuff isn't impressive and when he's off, he gets blasted.

    On the way to the playoffs, the 2006 Mets were desperate in finding arms after Duaner Sanchez's car accident (which probably cost them the World Series) and traded Nady for Roberto Hernandez and Perez. Perez pitched well in 2006, 2007 and for parts of 2008. Bidding against themselves and misjudging Perez's known flightiness was the huge error in Minaya's decision to keep him. The free agent signing of Bay made sense then and it makes sense now; he has been slow to adjust to New York and the pressure therein and now he's hurt with a concussion. Did anyone truly debate the signing of Bay at the time with a legitimate case against it? The Mets needed a bat and they got one of the top two available hitters; they weren't going to get the other----Matt Holliday----because the Cardinals paid him double what the Mets gave Bay and Holliday wanted no part of New York.

    Randolph needed to go, but the reluctance to make the change and Minaya's kindness----something that is a hindrance to running a major league organization----forced the indecisive handling of said firing. With Jerry Manuel, his retention was, in part, due to the misapplied "fairness" that Minaya has clung to. What happened in 2008 and 2009 can't be laid at the desk of the manager alone, but sometimes a GM has to be unfair in his dealings and decisions. 

    The attack against Rubin was the most insipid and fireable off-field offense in Minaya's tenure. Under siege and angry after having to dismiss a trusted ally, Minaya stupidly lashed out and Rubin is taking his revenge again and again.

    Certain incontrovertible facts exist here. Rubin never denied having asked about getting a job in baseball and claims to have accepted Minaya's apology for the gaffe----NY Times Bats Blog, July 30th, 2009 and FanHouse/Amazin' Avenue Posting, July 28th 2009.

    Accepting the apology is one thing, but being passive aggressive and then overtly hostile is another. 

    Seek even-handed analysis and that's what you get. Rubin's potluck, throw everything in brand of reporting is an open secret to anyone who has the stomach to get through his exposé in 3 parts. 

    What precisely does Francisco Rodriguez's assault against his father-in-law in the Citi Field family room have to do with Minaya or Wilpon? What were they supposed to do about it aside from responding to it in the forceful manner they have in its aftermath?

     Dwight Gooden was arrested in the spring for DUI and leaving the scene of an accident and Rubin makes the specious leap from that incident to suggest that the Mets are somehow responsible; that they should----in an unsaid inference----not have inducted Gooden into their Hall of Fame last month. What one thing has to do with another is unclear and unstated.

    Johan Santana was accused of rape in the days following the 2009 season; no charges were filed. Was Minaya supposed to enact paranoid, Watergate-style techniques to prevent such occurrences? With men in their 20s and 30s, how is this to be regulated and prevented by an employer?

    Does it need to be said to grown men not to punch people in the face? Not to behave in ways that could construed as sexually inappropriate? And if it does, what is the employer's recourse in such matters? Like the old Robin Williams routine lampooning the police force in England's entreaty to a perp, "Stop!!! Or, I'll...um....yell 'Stop!!!' again!"

    What were they supposed to do?

    Rubin doesn't specify.

    Rubin writes about the club spending practices regarding prospects, but instead of using the same expertise that he apparently felt made him qualified to work in baseball himself, he went to Baseball America and used the amount of money spent as a reason to criticize the minor league system as if the two things are explicitly connected. Numerous entities spent the entire winter finding reasons to lambaste the Mets; the minor league system was said to be "barren"; instead, the team has shown a large number of useful-to-excellent prospects who've come to the big leagues and performed admirably and more. 

    Because Josh Thole, Jonathon Niese, Ike Davis, Mike Pelfrey and Bobby Parnell have been so promising, the argument had to be altered to the money the team has spent in finding players. Money is a factor in building a solid minor league foundation, but you can't have it every way; you can't credit a team like the Athletics under the Moneyball farce for saving money by finding baseball players rather than spending lavishly on glossy names, then tear into another team for trying to save a few dollars despite using a different methodology. Making things worse to this argument is that the Mets' young players look good! 

    Shouldn't Rubin----interested as he is in a job inside baseball----be able to come to his own conclusions regarding prospects? Wouldn't that be a prerequisite to working for a club in any capacity? Instead he goes to "credible" sources to fit neatly into his prejudged piece. 

    It was easier for Rubin to formulate his critique finding the remaining negativity about the club from such sources rather that to run the risk of having his tenets torn to shreds and sabotaged by facts.

    Then we get into the pure speculative nature of the Wilpons finances after the Madoff losses.

    Rubin writes the following without any citation whatsoever:

While the finances of the Wilpon family, which owns the Mets, are not public knowledge, their primary business is Sterling Equities, a real estate company. That sector of the economy has taken a particular hit in recent years.

Of course, then there's the Madoff mess, which is a double-whammy:

At least one Mets-related fund reportedly is recognized by the court-appointed trustee overseeing the disbursement of Madoff assets to victims as having profited from the scam -- meaning more money was removed from Madoff funds than invested over the years. Yet the Wilpons undoubtedly believed they had accumulated vastly more on their balance sheet than they actually possessed.

Using hypothetical numbers: If a person invested $10 million over 20 years with Madoff and had withdrawn $12 million over that span, technically they are net gainers. It probably does not feel that way if the investor believed he had $100 million.

    Is there a basis for the doom and gloom of the Wilpons', and by proxy, the Mets' finances? Or is this simply some unknowing fool who's too lazy or incompetent to do any actual digging to try and find out the reality of the situation and report on it? 

    Rubin tosses an aside comment about real estate taking "a big hit in recent years". And? That means what? If he doesn't know the ins-and-outs of the Wilpons' real estate machinations, how can he make the assumption that they're having financial difficulties because of it?

    Then he extrapolates from numbers based on absolutely nothing. You hear numerous different statements of the Wilpon financial empire and none have been corroborated nor refuted. Jeff Wilpon has said that the Madoff situation is not affecting team operations and they haven't. They spent money on Bay; they've spent money to sign their draft choices; and were willing to add payroll to improve the club as they were in contention early in the summer. 

    Stemming from club inaction, the idea is prevalent that finances were the cause of the Mets failure to bring in a big name starter/reliever last winter and that they didn't trade for a big name pitcher to help the starting rotation at mid-season.

    Who were they supposed to sign? Jason Marquis? Jon Garland? Randy Wolf? Have any of these pitchers made the Mets look foolish for their reluctance to overpay for them? Marquis has been hurt; Garland didn't want to pitch in New York; and Wolf has been what Wolf is----mediocre.

    What about Cliff Lee? Judging from the Yankees offer for Lee and what the Mariners netted for the lefty from the Rangers, the Mets would have had to surrender Ike Davis leading the package for the right to rent Lee and then sign him for $130-160 million.

    Roy Oswalt? Let's say he would've agreed to come to the Mets, would that justify giving up Jon Niese and other prospects and taking on Oswalt's contract? The other pitchers available----Jake Westbrook, et al.----weren't worth the cost. 

    You cannot make these charges and not have hard data to back them up, but that's precisely what Rubin does. 

    Is Rubin a dogged reporter performing due diligence before publishing a piece? Or is he a clumsy and unprepared hit man splaying bullets in the general vicinity of his target hoping one of the shots hits and kills his enemy, not due to skill, but volume?  

    Barring a miracle, Minaya is not going to be back as GM. The Mets are portrayed terribly in part because they've earned it. If it takes the hiring of a new GM be it Gerry Hunsicker, Kevin Towers, Pat Gillick or whomever to restore credibility, then that's what they need to do; but for a lazy hack like Rubin to come out with something so transparently antagonistic, it has to be addressed and torn to pieces; it has to be exposed for what it is.

    Had he sought out evenhanded analysis, that's what he would've gotten; instead he chose to make himself look like a bitter clown who wrote the story first and then found ways to neatly fit references into the predetermined conclusions.

    The absence of organization and consequences for which the Mets are constantly harangued is just as evident by the majority of those covering the Mets. Because the Mets are in turmoil, that doesn't make it any more acceptable for reporters to do their jobs unprofessionally, but that's exactly what Adam Rubin has done on ESPN New York. He and his employers should be ashamed of themselves. For some reason, I doubt that they are. 

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I was a guest last Thursday with Sal at SportsFan Buzz. You can click the link to Sal's site to download the Podcast or listen directly here. Also, check Sal's Facebook page here.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.

• Reputations take a beating----and possibly so do their paychecks:

    With Lou Piniella resigning as Cubs manager after failing in his quest to win a championship (or at least a pennant) on the North Side of Chicago; with Joe Torre teetering on falling short in guiding his team into the playoffs for a stunning 15th straight year (the Dodgers aren't dead yet); with Tony La Russa in a dogfight to win his division; and with Bobby Cox retiring, the old guard managers----managers who were considered imperative----are having their value questioned. While any lull in a history of long-term resume of winning can be seen as an anomaly, it doesn't diminish the legitimate wonderment of how much a manager adds or subtracts to his team.

     How much of an affect does the manager have on his team? And are the above-mentioned "star" managers worthy of the accolades and money that they receive as a part of the circular process of winning equating value and vice versa?

    Just as it's unfair to blame them for the failures, on the same token, isn't it logical to take a second look at their successes and wonder whether other managers cold have achieved the same results? 

    Piniella's reputation was diminished by the way the Cubs faltered in the playoffs the two times they made it under his guidance; what made his Chicago experience worse was how quickly things came apart in a season of mediocrity of 2009 and a disaster in 2010. The built-in excuses for Piniella that were present with the Yankees (deranged, meddling owner and constant turmoil); the Reds (he won that one title in 1990 before departing after 3 seasons); the Mariners (they kept running into the Yankees); and the Devil Rays (he was a bad fit for them in every respect other than he's from Tampa and needed a job), were not there for the job he did with the Cubs. Everything was designed to win immediately and he essentially got all the players he wanted and felt he needed to compete and win, but they didn't and a major reason for that was Piniella.

    The 2007 team that he somehow coaxed into the playoffs was not very good and benefited from a weak division before being swept away in the playoffs. Piniella was called out for the loss to the Diamondbacks because of his decision to yank Carlos Zambrano after the seventh inning in game 1 despite Zambrano rolling along and having only thrown 85 pitches; I'm of the belief that they would've lost the series even had they won the first game. 

    In 2008, Piniella cost his team the series almost immediately by starting Ryan Dempster in game 1 over Zambrano, Ted Lilly or Rich Harden. He also alienated Kosuke Fukudome with his public criticisms; the team was dispatched by Torre's Dodgers before they could even blink. 

    You can't gloss over an 0-6 playoff record.

    In fact, if Piniella left the Cubs of his own accord and decided he wanted to manage again, would there be the clamoring for him that there was after 2002 and 2006? Someone would hire him, but he wound have neither the power in personnel nor the big contract and blind, hypnotic belief that he'd figure it out one way or the other.

    Ken Rosenthal wrote a laudatory column to Piniella as the news of his retirement became public. The entire text is available here, but Rosenthal does a ridiculous bit of absolution as to Piniella's role in the Cubs debacle: 

"There is no question Piniella is blameless for much of what ails the Cubs," I wrote. "Managers, though, rarely are fired for a specific litany of sins. They're fired, more often than not, when teams need a new energy, a new start. Hello, Cubs."

Piniella was upset with the column. When I saw him a few weeks later, he said, "If you were around the team every day, you would know the problem is not the manager."

And then, in our meeting Saturday, he looked at me with that familiar glint in his eye, smiled and said, "Maybe you were right."

I doubt he actually meant that. In fact, I told Piniella that maybe he had been right. The Cubs proved to be such a poorly put-together club, it's difficult to say that a managerial change would have made any difference.

    I would be stunned if there was one player with the Cubs that Piniella didn't agree to having on the roster; that he didn't have a great influence in the insane contract that netted Alfonso Soriano or the one that kept Aramis Ramirez. He named Kevin Gregg as his closer in 2009----his biggest mistake last year. How does he get a pass?

    It's a wonderful, soda-rich, Mike Francesa-like world in which to live where nothing is ever anyone's fault and one is never wrong; but Piniella was hired for his personality and because he won. The personality was watered down as he aged and saw the Cubs crumbling; and he did win, but was responsible for the playoff downfalls.  

    Torre's, Cox's and La Russa's reputations are still intact and they'd get paid and receive the gala welcome in any venue should they decide to manage elsewhere, but would it yield the expected result?

    Did Torre benefit from a team that was tired of having been under Buck Showalter's anal retentive thumb for years and ready to win after making their innocent climb? And was he due for a little luck after years of near misses as a player and manager in a career that did honor to the game but was never seen as being upper echelon quality?

    Was Cox's known laid back demeanor and reputation as a players' manager who fought for his troops to the end the reason the Braves won all those division titles or was it because he had a starting rotation of three Hall of Famers and a large payroll?

    Is La Russa's cerebral, scientific approach and old-school sensibilities the reason his teams are constantly in contention? Or has he had a lot of talent and taken advantage of a pitching coach/partner/guru, Dave Duncan, who like the proverbial prosecutor that could indict a ham sandwich, could turn that same ham sandwich into a 12-15 game winner?

    These men come with a reputation; they've been well-compensated and all (aside from Piniella) are Hall of Fame locks; but would the teams they had have been just as successful with a lesser-known manager?

    I'm not of the belief that a manager should be a conduit between the on-field product and the front office; that he have no power whatsoever as was asserted as Moneyball; the faceless middle-manager theory of one who implements front office ideas can't work with a team of limited talent; but it's only fair to dole blame to the big names when according credit. It seems as if there's always an excuse for the failures with the "great manager", while he's getting paid lucratively for the positive outcome.

    The "great manager" brings along with him immediate credibility for fans and players; they're able to recruit free agents and sell tickets and drum up interest. They do have value especially in comparison with their lower-paid brethren, some of whom plainly and simply don't know what they're doing (see John Russell of the Pirates); but to leave them blameless when things go wrong? 

    Baseball needs characters like Piniella, Torre, Cox and La Russa; but perhaps they shouldn't be so well-compensated for doing a job that others may have been able to do at least as well for a far more reasonable price. They're getting paid for their reputations and bottom line, but maybe it's time to re-think the value of the great manager, especially if he's not all that great practically and theoretically to begin with.

• Speaking of the Cubs and Ken Rosenthal:

    In that same column, Rosenthal advances the possibility that Yankees manager Joe Girardi might be both a fit and be interested in the Cubs job. Girardi is from Illinois; went to school at Northwestern; and played for the Cubs. Rosenthal doesn't believe it's likely, but possible and says he'll believe it when he sees it.

    Then again, he also suggests that current Cubs GM Jim Hendry will be the one making the hire----something I'll believe when I see it. I have a hard time believing that the Cubs new owners----the Ricketts family----are going to keep Hendry. With the hiring of stat guy Ari Kaplan to work in the front office, it's the first step into a more numerical approach and I think it's going to lead to Hendry's dismissal or marginalization and the importing of Kevin Towers to be the new GM. Towers learned frugality* with the Padres, is respected and would be a great fit for the Cubs.

*The common misconception about the word "frugal" is that it means being cheap; it actually means avoiding waste, something Towers had to put into practice considering the Padres constantly fluctuating bottom line and repeated sell-offs due to off-field issues.

    There's been some saber-rattling from Girardi about the Cubs job as well and he'd better be careful. I think it's more of a negotiating ploy with the Yankees than any desire to leave. He'd never make the money with the Cubs that he'll get with the Yankees; he won't have the same chance to win; and he'd be under just as much pressure in Chicago as he is with the Yankees. Other than going home, what's the point?

    I think he's in for a rude awakening with the Yankees if he tries to leverage the Cubs opportunity into getting a better Yankees contract because the Yankees might turn around and tell him to not let the door hit him in the behind on the way out and name Tony Pena manager knowing that they'd win about the same number of games with Pena as they would with Girardi----maybe even a few more.

• Who cares what Rob Dibble says?

    When Nationals broadcaster Rob Dibble went into his chauvinistic rant about women at the ballpark a couple of weeks ago, it caused a giant stir that was more of an attention-grabbing device by those who claimed to be so offended than a visceral reaction to the comments themselves. 

    I didn't care what Dibble said then; nor do I care about what he's saying now about the Nationals handling of Stephen Strasburg. The entire Dibble-prescription to fix that which ails Strasburg can be read here from the Washington Post D.C. Sports Blog by Dan Steinberg.

    The one excerpt that made me literally burst out laughing was the following:

"I'm not a doctor, and I haven't read the MRI yet, but I'm pretty sure he's gonna come back fine."

    He hasn't read the MRI yet? Are the Nationals going to provide Dibble with the results of the test to get his well-thought-out medical opinion before moving forward with a treatment plan for Strasburg?

    I'd like to see Rob Dibble holding the MRI up to the light, glasses on the end of his nose, saying "Hmmmm", nodding with his lips pursed and stroking his chin as he comes to his conclusion in reading the results.

    Is he serious? 

    Maybe there should be a reality show: Rob Dibble-non-M.D.

    I'm not going to get into the content of his rant because it's a waste of time. Just click on the above link and read it. I can only sit here and shake my head not because of what he said, but because there are people bothering to respond to him for anything that comes out of his mouth. 

• Viewer Mail 8.25.2010:

Jeff (Acting Boss) at Red State Blue State writes RE Brandon Morrow, Tim Lincecum, Jose Bautista and Ivan Nova:

Thanks for calling out those other draftees that came before Timmeh. I get tired of hearing that critique of the Mariners. No one knew Timmeh was gonna be what he is.

Also, curious as to your thoughts on the Blue Jay/Yankees fracas from 8/23.

And looking at Bautista's numbers before this year... I'm wondering: is there something going on? I'd be an idiot not to ask.

    Just like the savagery the Twins endured for taking Joe Mauer before Mark Prior, it's all a matter of "what have you done for me lately" and a "look, I was right" mentality more than well-thought-out analysis. I've said it again and again, I'd have taken Morrow over Lincecum as well. 

    No one is above suspicion for the stealth PED suggestion regarding Bautista. Who knows? His rise is a bit dubious, but there's always a chance that he's clean. 

    Regarding the fracas, it was a combination of Bautista trying to intimidate the young pitcher more than him truly believing that Nova was throwing at him. Much like the Kevin Youkilis-Johan Santana shouting match in Fenway last year, it backfired. Nova stood his ground and wasn't intimidated. Doubtless another team might try a similar act of gamesmanship, but word gets around quickly and they won't try it again with Nova. I was impressed with his stuff and his fearlessness and I'm sure his teammates and management were as well.

The Brooklyn Trolley Blogger (Brooklyn Capo) writes RE the Rays:

Rays Way ~ They may be in for a little trouble next year. But they are in damn good hands. It starts from the top with Sternberg.
Andrew Friedman and Gerry Hunsicker are very good Baseball executives. Joe Maddon has proven himself to be a good manager (if a little quirky) and is on the complete same page of music with his hierarchy as they are with him.
That formula works. Add in Don Zimmer and Mike Cubbage, and you have some very smart background voices. If next year presents a rough road for the Rays, I trust they'll smooth it out smartly and consistently with the ruthlessness you described.

    I'm not on-board with calling Friedman the "best GM in baseball", but he's become gutsy and top tier. Hunsicker may be the next GM of the Mets and I'd approve the hiring.

    I disagree regarding Maddon. I don't think he's a particularly good manager on the field; nor do I like the way he handles the clubhouse, but as stated earlier, it's the bottom line that's important and they're winning. That team would win with another competent manager----possibly win more than they do now.

Jane Heller at Confessions of a She-Fan writes RE Suzyn Waldman's "enthusiastic" response to Roger Clemens's return to the Yankees in 2007:

You posted the "celebration" and now my ears are bleeding!!!!!

    Blame Suzyn, not me!!!! 

• The Prince on the Podcast:

    I was a guest last Thursday with Sal at SportsFan Buzz. You can click the link to Sal's site to download the Podcast or listen directly here. Also, check Sal's Facebook page here.

• Paul Lebowitz's 2010 Baseball Guide:

    My book is still available on Amazon, I-Universe and Barnes and Noble.com. It's available for download as an E-book here. You can also now get it for less that five bucks on BN via download here.